THE OBJECT OF LOGIC IN THOMAS AQUINAS

Abstract

The objective of this article is to grant its possible readers the interpretative assumptions without which the comprehensibility of the object of logic (ens rationis) could not be evidenced. Indeed, this article, only at the end, after the expressed thematisation of these assumptions has been carried out, tangentially to the consideration of the entity of reason of second intention, which is, properly, the object of logic. Consequently, it can be said that, in this study, the preliminary considerations will be exposed by which one understands easily the Tomasian assertion (of classical logic) according to which the objective universe of logic is reduced to a very particular type of entities, that are, properly, the entities of reason. To achieve this, the concepts of “will”, “intellect”, “intelligible species”, “intentionality”, “understood Intention” (intentio intellecta), and others were considered. After such an introductory course, in the last section, it was demonstrated that the object of logic cannot be anything other than the ideal entity, par excellence, which is the entity of reason of second intention.