THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL EUGENICS

Abstract

In this paper, I intend to present and critique what Nicholas Agar has called "liberal eugenics," the idea that parents would be fully entitled to use genetic engineering in order to promote the enhancement of certain physical, cognitive, or behavioral abilities of their children according to their own values. To this end, I first point out the central elements of the author's argument; the distinction he draws between new and old forms of eugenics, the reasons why parents would be entitled to enhance their children, and the limits that should be observed by them both in order to avoid the errors of the old forms of eugenics and in respect of the main argument for pro-enhancement, which is liberal respect for autonomy. In a second step, however, I point to a tension between reasons and limits in Agar's argument, so as to conclude that, if it is to escape this apparent contradiction, liberal eugenics needs to be revised in some of its fundamental theses.