THE ‘MİCRO’ IS NOT ENOUGH: SOME PLURALİSTİC RESPONSES TO MİCROPHYSİCAL REDUCTİONİSM

Abstract

As the basis for metaphysical explanations, microphysical properties are generally defined as fundamental properties. In this context, we rarely doubt that the microphysical properties used to determine resemblance among objects or to distinguish them from others operate at a different level than macrophysical properties. This article addresses several inclusive and pluralistic perspectives developed in response to reductionist explanations that prioritize microphysical properties. The first of these is the view known as microphysical manyism, which implies that when considering levels of properties, they should not be evaluated independently of the physical foundations of objects. The second inclusive perspective, pragmatic pluralism, insists on an explanatory framework consistent with the intuitiveness of causal and mereological explanations. Both perspectives are important because they challenge the privileged status of microphysical reductionism. To examine this debate, the article explores approaches that explain some details by drawing on similarity nominalism and trope theory, while also analyzing the justifications behind perspectives that equate natural properties with sparse properties.