CRIMINAL MIND OR CRIMINAL SITUATION? RE-CONCEPTUALIZING RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN LAW

Abstract

Rational Choice Theory (RCT) has consistently backed the theoretical development of criminal law's offender culpability and the justification of deterrent strategies, based on the assumption that crimes are committed via rational, calculative decision-making. This study critically explores the assumptions behind RCT in criminal law, using current breakthroughs in behavioral science and situational crime prevention theory. It contends that the standard rational offender theory fails to account for cognitive bias, emotional manipulation, and situational contingency, all of which have a significant influence on criminal behavior. From a doctrinal standpoint, it undermines the legal conception of mens rea as a pure exercise in reason and necessitates a rethinking of culpability norms that recognize restricted rationality and impaired decision-making capability. The article also emphasizes the fragility of deterrence theory based on rational actor assumptions and recommends legal alignment with integrative models that integrate behavioral information with environmental modification to prevent crime. The article further broadens the legal analysis beyond the rational actor model by placing offender decision-making within a broader contextual and psychological context, proposing that criminal responsibility and punishment would more accurately reflect the nuanced interplay of cognitive limitations and situational cues. This reconceptualization not only makes criminal law more consistent with scientific realities, but it also opens the door to more complex and successful crime prevention tactics that transcend punitive rationales. Furthermore, this study contributes to legal scholarship by encouraging a jurisprudential model that promotes interdisciplinarity, thereby improving the theoretical coherence and practical effectiveness of criminal justice systems in addressing contemporary crime and offender behavior challenges.