Keywords
Perception of corruption
Political corruption
Consequences of corruption
Social transformation
How to Cite
Abstract
Political, economic, social and cultural factors determine the level of perception and corruption in the country by social groups. Therefore, the study of this phenomenon should be conducted taking into account the factors outlined. The purpose of the academic paper is to study and analyze the consequences of corruption for societies in key dimensions: political, economic, and socio-cultural. Methodology. The method of systematic analysis is used in the academic paper to identify general corruption trends in the world and in the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, taking into account the growing corruption risks due to the war in Ukraine. The consequences of corruption are considered in the following dimensions: political, economic, and social. Initially, the authors analyze the dynamics of the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018-2022. The following indicators were used to evaluate corruption: Political Corruption Index, Legislative Corruption Index, Public Sector Corruption Index, Executive Corruption Index, Judicial Corruption Index, and Corruption Decisions of the Judiciary. The results of analyzing the perception of corruption and political corruption in the EECA region demonstrate the lack of dynamic changes in countering and preventing abuse of power. Throughout 2012-2022, a stable value of the Corruption Perceptions Index (34,5 - 35 points) and political corruption (0,5 points on a scale of 0 - 1) was observed in the region. The highest level of corruption was detected in the judiciary, with the executive branch of government in second place. An average level of corruption has been identified in the public sector as a whole. The experience of EECA countries demonstrates the correlation between political corruption and the development of civil society, the average level of citizen participation in political life, and particular restrictions on rights and freedoms. The Civil Liberties and Civil Society Participation Indices are still at the same level as the Political Corruption Index. At the same time, in the economic dimension, the dynamics of GDP per capita indicate an increase in the quality of life despite the lack of positive developments in combating corruption. In the social dimension, corruption leads to peaceful protests, increases threats to security and peace, and deepens social inequality among different social groups. The practical significance of the research results lies in formulating recommendations for EECA governments on the digitalization of public services and processes to enhance the transparency of public authorities as a way to prevent corruption.
References
Chen, F. (1997). The dilemma of eudaemonic legitimacy in post-Mao China. Polity, 29(3), 421-439.
Choi, E., & Woo, J. (2010). Political corruption, economic performance, and electoral outcomes: A cross-national analysis. Contemporary Politics, 16(3), 249-262. Konstantinidis, I., & Xezonakis, G. (2013). Sources of tolerance towards corrupted politicians in Greece: The role of trade offs and individual benefits. Crime, Law and Social Change, 60, 549-563.
Coppedge, M. et al. (2022). V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date]. Dataset Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at: https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22
Eurostat (2023). Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 for disposable income by sex and age group EU-SILC survey. Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ILC_DI11/settings_1/table?lang=en
Fund for Peace's (2023). Fragile States Index 2022. Available at: https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22-FSI-Report-Final.pdf
Gong, T., & Wang, S. (2013). Indicators and implications of zero tolerance of corruption: The case of Hong Kong. Social Indicators Research, 112, 569-86.
Heywood, P. (1997). Political corruption: Problems and perspectives. Political Studies, 45, 417-35.
Huntington, S. P. (2017). Modernization and corruption. In Political corruption, 253-264. Routledge.
Klašnja, M., Lupu, N., & Tucker, J. A. (2021). When do voters sanction corrupt politicians? Journal of Experimental Political Science, 8(2), 161-171.
Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V., & Soares, R. R. (2005). Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter. Economics & politics, 17(1), 1-35.
Li, H., Xiao, H., Gong, T. (2015). The impact of economic well-being on perceptions of anti-corruption performance: Evidence from China. Policy and Society, 34 (2), 97–109. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.05.001
Manzetti, L., & Wilson, C. J. (2007). Why do corrupt governments maintain public support? Comparative political studies, 40(8), 949-970.
Melgar, N., Rossi, M., & Smith, T. W. (2010). The perception of corruption. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22(1), 120-131.
Mutaşcu, M., & Dănuleţiu, D. C. (2010). Corruption and Social Welfare in the EU27 Countries. Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 12(1), 450-459.
National Agency on Corruption Prevention (2023a). Anti-corruption strategy. Available at: https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/antykoruptsijna-strategiya/
National Agency on Corruption Prevention (2023b). Report on the results of the survey of the population and business: Corruption in Ukraine 2022: Understanding, Perception, Prevalence. Available at: https://nazk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/1f23b766-e031-4c3f-81a4-0167b4f93116.pdf
Nayir, D. Z., & Herzig, C. (2012). Value orientations as determinants of preference for external and anonymous whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 107, 197-213.
Tavakoli, A. A., Keenan, J. P. & Cranjak-Karanovic, B. (2003). Culture and whistleblowing an empirical study of Croatian and United States managers utilizing Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Journal of Business Ethics, 43, 49-64.
Taylor, E. Z., & Curtis, M. B. (2010). An examination of the layers of workplace influences in ethical judgments: Whistleblowing likelihood and perseverance in public accounting. Journal of Business Ethics, 93, 21-37.
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2023). On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2021-2025. Law of Ukraine 2322-IX as of 20.06.2022. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2322-20#Text
Transparency International (2023). Score changes 2012-2021. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/ukr
Transparency International’s (2023a). CPI 2022 Global Results & Trends. Available at: https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2022_GlobalResultsTrends.xlsx
Transparency International’s (2023b). CPI 2022: Corruption as a fundamental threat to peace and security: Research analysis by Roberto Martínez B. Kukutschka. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-corruption-fundamental-threat-peace-security
Winters, M. S., & Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2013). Lacking information or condoning corruption: When do voters support corrupt politicians? Comparative Politics, 45(4), 418-436.
World Bank (2023). GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). International Comparison Program, World Bank. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?view=chart
Yang, H., & Zhao, D. (2018). Performance legitimacy, state autonomy and China's economic miracle. In Debating Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China, 174-192. Routledge.
Zakaria, P. (2013). Is corruption an enemy of civil society? The case of Central and Eastern Europe. International Political Science Review, 34(4), 351-371.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2023 Lex Humana (ISSN 2175-0947)