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INAUGURATED ESCHATOLOGY: A TIME TRAVEL STORY

ESCATOLOGIA INAUGURADA: UMA HISTÓRIA DE VIAGEM NO TEMPO

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Abstract

This article aims to provide an explication of an influential conceptualisation of the Christian notion of 'inaugurated eschatology'. This influential conception of eschatology has been proposed by N.T. Wright; however, an intelligibility issue is identified here, which needs to be addressed if this conception is to be affirmed. Hence, a philosophical model of this conception is formulated through the utilisation of the temporal ontology of Priority Presentism introduced by Sam Baron and a specific interpretation of the Moving Objective Present model of time travel, inspired by Sara Bernstein and others. This model enables inaugurated eschatology to be explicated in a clear and consistent manner, and the important intelligibility issue will be shown to have been successfully dealt with.

Keywords: Eschatology; Resurrection; New Creation; Time Travel; Falling Elevator; Falling Elevator Model.

Resumo

Este artigo tem como objetivo fornecer uma explicação de uma influente conceituação da noção cristã de "escatologia inaugurada". Essa influente concepção de escatologia foi proposta por N. T. Wright; contudo, identifica-se aqui um problema de inteligibilidade que precisa ser enfrentado para que essa concepção possa ser afirmada. Assim, formula-se um modelo filosófico dessa concepção por meio da utilização da ontologia temporal do Presentismo Prioritário (Priority Presentism), introduzida por Sam Baron, e de uma interpretação específica do modelo do Presente Objetivo em Movimento (Moving Objective Present) para a viagem no tempo, inspirada em Sara Bernstein e outros autores. Esse modelo permite que a escatologia inaugurada seja explicada de maneira clara e consistente, demonstrando-se que o importante problema de inteligibilidade foi tratado com sucesso.

Palavras-chave: Escatologia; Ressurreição; Nova Criação; Viagem no Tempo; Elevador em Queda; Modelo do Elevador em Queda.

1. Introduction

According to N.T. Wright (2007, 2016, 2020), Jesus' resurrection on Easter morning launched the beginning of the new creation, inaugurating the eschaton by bringing the future realisation of the new creation into the present, a concept which we can term 'Present Eschatological Realisation' (hereafter, PER), and state it succinctly as follows:

(1) (Inaugurated Eschatology)	The resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth has launched the future, fully realised and consummated new creation in the present.

In the first century, 'resurrection' signified a new bodily life after death (Wright, 2007). The New Testament asserts that just as Jesus was resurrected, so too will all believers be resurrected to partake in the life of the new world, with Jesus being the 'firstborn' from among the dead (Col. 1:18; Rev. 1:5) and the 'new Adam' in a new creation (Rom. 5:12-21; Matt. 4:1-11). Eternity will be spent on a recreated earth (Rev. 21:1-2; Isa. 65:17, 66:22; 2 Pet. 3:13), with the creator summing up all things in Jesus the Messiah (Wright, 2016). The bodily resurrection of Jesus signifies the start of the new creation, where the whole of creation will be renewed, not out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo) but as a transformation of the existing creation (*creatio ex vetere*) (Wright, 2020). Wright's emphasis is on the present impact and overlapping reality of the future age, implying a dynamic interplay where the future dimension exerts influence within the present. The onset of this new creation is a continuous story of creation, overlapping and interlocking the old and the new. The new creation has already begun through Jesus' resurrection but has not yet reached its ultimate fulfilment (Wright, 2016). The current era and the promised 'age to come' are overlapping due to the gospel events, with the power of God's future age already at work in the present (Wright, 2020). Christians live in the overlap of the already and not yet, called to manifest coming realities while also looking ahead to the total cosmic renewal when Christ brings the new creation to its fullness upon his return (Wright, 2007). The concept of PER in Wright's theology posits that the future new creation is already influencing and transforming the present reality, initiated by Jesus' resurrection and ongoing through the work of the Church and the Holy Spirit. This idea challenges the traditional linear view of time and raises the following conceptual challenge:

(2) (Intelligibility)	(i) Temporal coherence: How can a future that has not yet occurred be active and operative in the present, seemingly contradicting the principles of temporality and causality? (ii) Ontological challenge: How can the 'not yet' (future) coexist with the 'already' (present) without altering our understanding of existence?

These challenges form the basis of the Intelligibility Objection, which raises the challenge of how the future, which has not yet occurred, can influence the present without conflicting with temporal coherence—where time is expected to flow linearly—and causality, where causes must precede their effects. This questions the coherence of a theological model where the future and present simultaneously overlap in a non-linear temporal framework.[1] To affirm the veracity of PER, this objection must be addressed. The central focus of this article will be on doing just that by utilising certain concepts within philosophical theology, metaphysics and the philosophy of time. Specifically, there will be a synthesis of the temporal ontology of 'Priority Presentism', introduced by Sam Baron, and an interpretation of the 'Movable Present View of Time-Travel' inspired by Sara Bernstein and related hypertime models (e.g., van Inwagen 2010). Bringing these two concepts together will provide us with the basis to propose an intelligible account of the PER – that is, through the utilisation of these concepts, we will have an explanation of how the PER could, in fact, be true. To an unpacking of this conceptualising intriguing solution we now turn.

2. The Nature of the Time and Time Travel

2.1 Time: Priority Presentism

The first aspect of the elucidation of the PER is that of an incorporation of the temporal ontology of Priority Presentism introduced by Sam Baron (2013, 2015), which can be stated succinctly as follows:

[1]This objection obviously assumes a 'Presentist' view of reality, over that of an 'Eternalist' view. And so this objection might not arise with the latter temporal ontology. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Wright's view seems to affirm the reality of 'robust temporal passage', and thus one must adopt (a certain form) of Presentism and hence be faced with this issue.

(3) (Priority Presentism)	The temporal and ontic structure of reality is such that only present entities exist diachronically fundamentally, no present entities are diachronically derivative, and all past and future entities exist (derivatively) and are diachronically grounded in the present (which accounts for the privileging of the present).

Priority Presentism, as proposed by Baron (2013), is a hybrid model of the temporal and ontic structure of reality that combines aspects of Presentism and Eternalism. It posits that only present entities exist fundamentally, while past and future entities exist but are grounded in the present (Baron, 2015, 1-3).[2] And concerning (3), here, 'exist diachronically' pertains to existence *through time* or at different times. Priority Presentism asserts that while entities at all times (past, present, future) *exist* in some sense (unlike standard Presentism which denies existence to past/future entities), only the *present* entities possess the status of being fundamental in this temporal, cross-time sense. Past and future entities exist dependently, or derivatively; their reality is grounded in the present. Focusing on the important notion of grounding, grounding is regularly characterised as a primitive expression of dependence, determination or explanation. This expression has been championed by 'grounders' (i.e. grounding theorists) such as Kit Fine (2012), Jonathan Schaffer (2009 and 2016) and Gideon Rosen (2010), amongst others.[3] In following Schaffer, we can construe the notion of grounding as such:

(4) (Grounding)	A primitive directed-dependency relation that is category-neutral and necessarily links the more fundamental entities to the less fundamental entities, in a manner that is analogous to causation.

Within the framework under analysis, grounding is a directed dependence relation that connects entities of any ontological category through a relation characterized by transitivity, irreflexivity, asymmetry, necessity, and hyperintensionality. This relation creates a strict partial order and hierarchy, establishing a necessary

[2]The following elucidation of the notion of grounding will go beyond Baron (2015) on certain points—in order to take into account certain developments within the literature concerning Jonathan Schaffer's theory of grounding (such as the analogy between grounding and causation). However, Baron (2015) would plausibly affirm the conception of grounding detailed here as he also operates within a Schafferian grounding context in putting forward the model of Priority Presentism. Moreover, Baron et al. (2019) have also provided another means for interpreting the analogy between grounding and causation—which seems to correspond well with Schaffer's views on this.

[3]For a historical explanation of these individuals' roles in developing the notion of ground, see (Raven, 2020).

dependency of the grounded entity on its grounds,[4] and thus one can use this notion to further construe the twin notions of fundamental and derivative as follows:

(5) (Fundamental)	**(6) (Derivative)**
An entity is fundamental if nothing grounds it.	An entity is derivative if something grounds it.

An entity is fundamental if nothing grounds it, and derivative if something grounds it (Schaffer, 2009). Grounding can be further classified as synchronic or diachronic (Baron, 2015, 4).Now, according to Baron (2015, 4),[5] a further fine-tuning of this conceptualisation of the grounding relation can be made by focusing on the temporal axis of grounding, which allows us to draw a distinction between two different types of grounding relations: *synchronic grounding* and *diachronic grounding*, both of which can be construed succinctly as follows:

(7) (Synchronic Grounding)	**(8) (Diachronic Grounding)**
A grounding relation is synchronic if an entity is grounded by another entity at the same time.	A grounding relation is diachronic if an entity exists at a particular time and is grounded by another entity at a different time.

An entity synchronically grounds another entity at the same time, while diachronic grounding occurs when an entity grounds another entity across time. Baron (2015) makes two assumptions about fundamental and derivative entities. First, fundamental entities are more 'real' than derivative entities, having a greater 'degree' of reality (McDaniel, 2017). Second, derivative entities are an 'ontological free-lunch' (Armstrong, 1997, 13), meaning they are no 'addition of being'. This is because grounding is a 'super-internal' relation where the existence and intrinsic nature of one relatum ensures the grounding relation obtains and the other relatum exists with its intrinsic nature (Schaffer, 2016; Bennett, 2011, 32-33). Thus, once the intrinsic nature of the grounds is fixed, the grounded entity necessarily comes along with it, and the existence of derivative entities 'comes for free' with the existence of fundamental entities.[6]

Now, in assuming the distinction between synchronic and diachronic grounding, Baron (2015, 5) posits a further distinction that can be drawn between how

[4]With Baron (2015) explicitly affirming this application of grounding to the notion of fundamentality.

[5]This distinction is original to Baron (2015) and has not been proposed or endorsed in writing by Schaffer.

[6]Again, an extension of Baron's thought has been provided here by tying the notion of an ontological free lunch to the super-internality of grounding (rather than that of David Armstrong's supervenience conception of it).

an entity is fundamental and derivative—namely, *synchronic fundamentality* and *derivativeness* and *diachronic fundamentality* and *derivativeness*, each of which can be construed succinctly as follows:

An entity that is grounded either synchronically or diachronically is not absolutely fundamental but may be relatively fundamental within reality's hierarchy. An entity can be synchronically fundamental (without grounds at the time it exists) yet not diachronically fundamental (having past grounds). As Baron (2015, 5) notes, such an entity can be at the "bottom" of the synchronic grounding chain even if it is diachronically grounded. Thus, only diachronically fundamental entities are absolutely fundamental. That is, according to Baron's definition using 'and', to be diachronically fundamental, an entity must lack both synchronic grounds at its time and diachronic grounds from other times. Such entities are the ultimate ontological bedrock at the present moment.

(9) (Synchronic F&D)	**(10) (Diachronic F&D)**
An entity is synchronically fundamental if nothing grounds it at the same time; an entity is synchronically derivative if something grounds it at the same time.	An entity is diachronically fundamental if nothing at another time grounds it; an entity is diachronically derivative if something at another time grounds it.

Given further refining of the notion of grounding and fundamentality, one can thus understand the model of Priority Presentism to be one that involves the diachronic grounding of past and future entities in the present moment, which contains the ontological grounds for all past and future entities. These grounds are presently existing instantiated tensed properties possessed by the world, which are "primitive properties that, in some unanalysable sense, 'point toward' the past [and future" (Baron, 2015, 7, 9-10). According to Priority Presentism, the past and future are diachronically grounded in these tensed properties. For example, dinosaurs (past) and sentient robots (future) are synchronically grounded in entities that exist in their respective times, but are diachronically grounded in the tensed properties presently instantiated by the world—the properties of it having been such that there were dinosaurs or being such that there will be sentient robots (Baron, 2015). Critically, Baron's view is that these presently instantiated tensed properties ground the past and future entities (e.g., the dinosaurs), not merely the truth that they existed or will exist. The property having been such that dinosaurs existed instantiated now, necessitates the (derivative) existence of the past dinosaurs themselves. It is important to note that this view differs from the 'Lucretian' view, defended by John Bigelow (1996) as it grounds the entities themselves, not just the truth of their exis-

tence, in the tensed properties possessed by the world (Baron, 2015). On the basis of all of this, and the fact of the diachronic grounding of the existence of the past and future entities in the presently existing temporal properties possessed by the world,[7] one now has a conceptual basis for understanding the nature of temporal passage in this view, which can be stated succinctly as follows:

More precisely, in Priority Presentism, time passes, which, according to Baron (2015, 9, parenthesis in text), can be understood minimally as 'the 'movement' of a metaphysically privileged present 'away' from the past, and into the future (this movement is not a literal movement, it is a metaphorical description of a movement-like feature of the metaphysics)'. Priority presentism does not take the metaphysical privilege that is had by the present to be ontological—in the sense that standard Presentism takes only present entities to exist—rather, the metaphysical privileging of the present is that of it consisting in the fact that only present entities exist with diachronic fundamentality (Baron, 2015). Hence, on this view, temporal passage is taken to have two components: first, temporal passage is taken to involve a global shift in what entities exist with diachronic fundamentality, such that, as noted by Baron (2015, 10), as time passes, 'future derivative [diachronic derivative] entities become fundamental [diachronic fundamental] as they become present, and then cease being fundamental [diachronic fundamental] as they become past'. And, second, temporal passage is taken here to involve the tensed properties (possessed by the world) that ground past and future entities. These properties, as Baron (2015, 10) notes, are properties that are taken to have two important features: firstly, the relevant types of tensed properties remain consistently present. Irrespective of the specific time that is present, some set of tensed properties appropriate to that moment are always in existence (instantiated) at that moment. For example, at 2026, the world instantiates properties like having been such that WWII occurred and being such that 2027 will occur. At 2026, it will instantiate different specific properties like having been such that 2025 occurred and being such that 2027 will occur. The capacity to instantiate such grounding properties is always present, ensuring continuity. This continuity ensures that the corresponding past and future entities, which are diachronically derivative, perpetually exist (in their derivative mode). Secondly, these specific tensed properties (e.g., being such that 2027 will occur) are never found (instantiated) in any past or future times relative to the time they are present (e.g., the property being such that 2027 will occur is instantiated only in 2026, not in 2026 itself). If they were present in these times, they would establish a new series

[7]However, Baron does also leave it open for what could indeed be the bearer of these properties. This will be an important point for the next sub-section—when God is taken to be this entity within the theistic construal of this temporal ontology.

of times at each respective moment, possibly leading to a complex, infinite hierarchy of meta-times linked through various grounding relations. Thus, on the basis of the constancy of the world's capacity to instantiate tensed properties, as some entity (or time-slice) becomes present, it gains the tense properties that enable it to ground the diachronically derivative past and future, and thus, when that entity ceases to be present (and thus becomes past), it loses these specific grounding properties (while gaining others, like having been such that X occurred) (Baron, 2015).

(11) (Temporal Passage)	Temporal passage is an inherent feature of reality involving: (i) a global shift from diachronic derivativeness to fundamentality when a moment becomes present; and (ii) the dynamic instantiation of temporal properties by the world as it occupies successive moments.

Taking all of these things into account, we can illustrate this model in Figure 1. as follows (with 'E_n' representing a particular event, the 'star shape', engulfing the circular shape, representing 'diachronic fundamental existence', 'T.P.' representing 'Temporal Properties', the 'oval shape' representing 'the world', the 'dashed oval shape' representing the 'past/present state of the world' and the 'singular head arrow' representing a 'synchronic/diachronic grounding relation'):[8]



Figure 1. Priority Presentism

In summary, priority presentism, developed by Baron, offers a unique approach to temporal ontology by combining aspects of Presentism and Eternalism

[8]Note: This figure is a simplified representation; the actual grounding relations are complex and involve properties grounding entire past/future histories.

by proposing that only present entities exist fundamentally, while past and future entities are derivatively existent and grounded in the present. This model employs grounding theory, conceptualised as a directed-dependency relation similar to causation, to explain the temporal and ontic structure of reality. Temporal passage in this framework is seen as a shift in the status of entities from diachronic derivativeness to fundamentality, accompanied by a change in the specific set of instantiated tensed properties that are always present in type at the privileged moment. These properties ground the past and future entities, changing as entities transition from being present to past. Priority Presentism thus provides a comprehensive view of time, blending the existence of entities with the principles of grounding.

2.2 Time Travel: Moving Objective Present

The second aspect of our philosophical foundation is that of the Movable Objective Present model of time travel (hereafter, MOP model) introduced by Sara Bernstein (1999), which can be stated succinctly as follows:

(12) (Time Travel)	A time traveller can alter the objective present within the temporal manifold, shifting it and the traveller's own location through time, thereby producing a dual change in the traveller's position and in the privileged temporal status of the manifold as a whole.

The theoretical background for the MOP model, according to Bernstein (2017), is provided by an aspect of Peter van Inwagen's work. Specifically, that of van Inwagen's (2010) time travel model for the possibility of changing the past. In van Inwagen's model, time travel in a growing block universe allows changing the past without paradox. This model, based on the growing block theory of time, asserts that both past and present are real, with the present being the expanding edge of reality. When a time traveller, like David in the 1966 World Cup example, travels back in time, the stretch of time between the departure and arrival points is erased, and a new paradox-free block is created from the point of arrival. This alteration means that only the traveller remembers the original sequence of events, as their presence can change the unfolding of events, potentially altering significant historical occurrences. Additionally, van Inwagen introduces 'hypertime,' a concept where time is seen within a larger temporal framework. An 'Intelligence' outside linear time can perceive events based on their sequence in hypertime, maintaining a linear progression even if time travel disrupts chronological order within our reality. In this model, time travel is akin to spatial relocation, with the traveller moving from

one temporal location to another without affecting the overall temporal landscape. However, events like the World Cup can have dual tenses, being past in temporal terms but future in hypertemporal terms, and there may be a duration mismatch between time and hypertime. We can thus illustrate the van Inwagian model as follows (with the left hand image representing a time line block without travel, and the image on the right representing a timeline block with time travel that includes a time traveller to the past and the regrowth of the block of time from the point of 1966 forward):

Figure 2. Van Inwagian Model

Within this theoretical framework concerning time travel—which has been termed 'Non-Ludovocinian time-travel', Bernstein (2017) has introduced a nuanced development to van Inwagen's model, which emphasises a time traveller's control over the location of the 'objective present' within the temporal manifold. In the context of David's time travel journey, this control over the objective present is exercised when he flips a switch in his time machine, and thus, it is not just a relocation to a different spot in the temporal manifold, as seen in van Inwagen's model. Instead, David (and other time travellers like him) changes the location of the 'objective present' for the *entire temporal manifold*, shifting it to the past while hypertime continues. That is, David is able to move around in time by relocating the objective present for everyone. Bernstein's (2017) MOP is thus distinctive as it involves changing the location of the 'objective present' in addition to relocating the time traveller. Hence, Bernsterin's model is different from van Inwagen's, due to the latter's affirmation of an annihilation of the the time slices between two points, such as from the point of W.C. at 1966 to 2026. However, in Bernstein's (2017) MOP model, annihilation of time slices is not an essential feature. That is, a key distinction highlighted by Bernstein concerns whether intervening time slices are annihilated (as in some readings of van Inwagen) or simply bypassed. Bernstein's MOP model, as interpreted here, does not strictly require annihilation. While van Inwagen's model often involves erasure and regrowth, the core of MOP, for our purposes, is the traveller's ability to relocate the objective present. If slices between departure (2026) and arrival (1966) are not annihilated, they would simply cease to be the present and become part of the (now altered or differently grounded) future relative to the newly established present of 1966. Their ontological status shifts. MOP merely requires the traveller's control over the location of the 'objective

present'. Moreover, the time machine in MOP could also *generate* time slices into existence—as would be the case in time travel to the future. Hence, MOP time travel is characterised by two important features: the movability of the objective present and the relocation of the time traveller. We can illustrate these two important features as follows (with the black thick line representing the 'objective present'):



Figure 3. The Moving Objective Present Model

That is, the time traveller in MOP has the ability to 'grasp' and control the location of the 'objective present', and thus shift it to their desired location in the temporal manifold. This is distinct from traditional time travel models, where the traveller only shifts their location in time. Therefore, in MOP, the mechanism of time travel itself involves a fundamental change in the location of the objective present. This requirement thus adds conceptual and metaphysical complexity to time travel, as the traveller must have a handle on the entire present, not just their own temporal location. Hence, the MOP time machine is more powerful than traditional time travel machines, controlling the objective present in addition to the temporal location of the traveller. Within this type of framework, according to Bernstein (2017), if a MOP traveller from 2026 sets their machine to return to 1966, then they must flip two switches: one that relocates the objective present from 2026 to 1969, and another that preserves the time traveller and their machine as the present is relocated. Why this is the case is because relocating the objective present to 1966 might result in a resetting of the universe to a time before the existence of the time traveller and their machine. Therefore, for MOP to count as time travel rather than mere resetting, it must involve the inclusion of the time traveller. Hence, once both switches are flipped, the traveller in our example, David, moves both themselves and the objective present to 1966. And if time travel takes time in MOP, the traveller's personal time en route will add to the hypertemporal duration of their trip (Bernstein, 2018). For instance, if the MOP machine takes a year to work and the traveller leaves 2026 for 1965, upon arrival, the hyperpresent will be in hyper 2027, even as the present is (re)located in 1966. In the MOP model, travelling to the future might also affect the rate of temporal passage for the entire universe relative to hypertime. That is, if the traveller moves faster or slower than the normal time rate (e.g., experiencing one hour while shifting the

present ten hours forward), it potentially speeds up or slows down time for everyone relative to the hypertime clock. This also could accelerate or decelerate the growing block's generation (if applicable) or simply change the mapping between time and hypertime. For instance, travelling ten hours into the future in one hyperhour speeds up reality's temporal passage relative to hypertime, generating the future block quicker or simply advancing the 'present' designation faster. Conversely, taking ten hyperhours for a one-hour future journey slows down the block's generation or the present's advance relative to hypertime. Crucially, the traveller's subjective experience (e.g., feeling like only an hour has passed) is linked to the objective shift in the present (e.g., ten hours forward) and the corresponding change in the rate of time's passage relative to hypertime. In these cases, however, non-time-travellers remain unaware of these changes in the rate relative to hypertime.

In all, MOP thus requires the existence of an objective present, which is a point of agreement among Presentism, moving spotlight, and growing block theories, though they differ in their conceptualisation of its nature. In time travel to the past, this type of time travel shifts the objective present of the entire temporal manifold to its past, while hypertime continues forward, and in time travel to the future, this type of time travel shifts the objective present of the entire temporal manifold to its future, while hypertime continues forward. Thus, the existence of an objective present in the MOP requires that there is a further postulation of a present time slice that is metaphysically privileged, which is understood in different ways within different temporal ontologies. However, instead of elucidating the MOP in the framework within that of the temporal ontologies of standard Presentism or Eternalism, we can now integrate the model into the framework of Priority Presentism, which creates a novel conceptualisation of time travel.

2.3 Time and Time Travel: Integrated Model

In utilising the philosophical framework of Priority Presentism and the Movable Objective Present model of time travel, we can now formulate an integrated model termed Priority Time Travel, which can be stated succinctly as follows:

(13) (Priority Time Travel)	A time traveller can alter the objective present, understood as the locus of diachronic fundamentality, shifting it and the traveller's own temporal location, thereby reconfiguring the grounding relations between past, present, and future entities.

In the original MOP model, as already noted, a time traveller such as David

can control the 'objective present' within the temporal manifold. Now, when applied to Priority Presentism, this control means a shifting of the metaphysically privileged present moment—the unique moment whose entities are diachronically fundamental and whose instantiated tensed properties ground all other (derivative) times—to a different point in time. That is, in Priority Presentism, the present is the only fundamentally real moment in this specific sense, with past and future entities being grounded in the present. Hence, if a time traveller were to shift the 'objective present,' they would be redefining what is fundamentally real at that moment. Thus, this shift would not just be a simple relocation in time, but a reconfiguration of what is ontologically primary at any given moment.

A crucial question arises concerning the radicalness of this time travel: Does shifting the objective present change the actual history of events across hypertime, or does it merely re-ground a single, fixed history from a different temporal perspective? While models like van Inwagen's or Hudson's allow for the possibility of history itself being altered (e.g., an event happens at t_1/ht_1 but does not happen at t_1/ht_2), the version of Priority Time Travel proposed here adopts a less radical approach. It posits that there is just one history, but the grounding structure of that history changes. The content of time t_n remains the same across hypertime, but its ontological status (fundamental or derivative) and the locus of the properties grounding it shift. This avoids certain paradoxes of changing the past/future but raises other questions addressed later. For example, if David travels back to 1966, he is not just moving to the past; he is also shifting the entire framework of reality so that 1966 becomes the new 'objective present' (the moment of diachronic fundamentality). This thus means the grounded reality of the past and future would also shift accordingly. That is, events and entities from the 'original' present (2026) and its future would become diachronically derivative, grounded in this new 'objective present' of 1966 via the tensed properties instantiated in 1966. The tensed properties instantiated in 2026 (which previously grounded 1966 and 2026+) cease to be the fundamental ground. This shift essentially rewrites reality's ontological grounding structure.

Hence, in the context of Priority Presentism, the notion of time travel is reimagined as the traveller's control over and movement of the 'objective present,' rather than the 'moving spotlight' typical in other models. In Priority Presentist time travel, the mechanism involves shifting the fundamental 'now'—the present moment that grounds all reality—to a desired temporal location. This shift causes a disruption in the successive temporal order of fundamentality, redefining which moments are considered diachronically fundamental. To illustrate this, let's consider

again our previous example of time travel to the past: David, who in 2026 wishes to travel back to the World Cup (W.C.) in 1966. In a conventional timeline without time travel, the objective present progresses successively: from the W.C. in 1966 (t1, derivative grounded in t3), to events following the W.C., to David's time of departure in 2026 (t3, fundamental), and onwards (t4+, derivative grounded in t3). However, with time travel in the Priority Presentism model, the objective present is relocated: David's action in 2026 shifts the 'now' back to 1966. The chronological order of fundamentality is disrupted, with 1966 becoming the new diachronically fundamental moment at the next hypertime moment. More precisely, in this integrated model, when a time traveller like David moves to a different time, say 1966, he doesn't simply travel to that year. Instead, he relocates the 'objective present' – the ontological anchor point – to 1966. This relocation has profound implications for the grounding of past and future entities. As in Priority Presentism, entities are diachronically grounded, meaning their existence at any given time is dependent on their relationship to the present. By shifting the 'objective present,' the time traveller redefines which entities are diachronically fundamental and which are derivative. That is, entities and events that were fundamental in the original present (2026 in our example) would become diachronically derivative post-time travel (now grounded in the new 1966 present). Similarly, entities and events from 1966, which were previously derivative (grounded in the 2026 present), would now assume the status of being diachronically fundamental.

Moreover, if David, within this integrated model, travels to the future, the ontological and grounding dynamics undergo a similar yet distinct transformation. Suppose David travels from 2026 to 2050. In this scenario, the 'objective present' shifts from 2026 to 2050. This relocation has significant consequences for the grounding of temporal entities. In Priority Presentism, the present moment is where all grounding occurs, determining the fundamental or derivative nature of all other temporal entities. When David travels to 2050, he shifts the ontological grounding anchor to this future year. Consequently, entities and events that were fundamental in the original present of 2026 would become diachronically derivative in this new scenario. They are now grounded in a future that has become the new 'objective present.' Meanwhile, entities and events from 2050, which were initially future projections grounded in the 2026 present, have now become diachronically fundamental. They are no longer contingent upon or grounded in the past 'present' but are now the defining basis of reality. This shift in the 'objective present' from 2026 to 2050 reconfigures the entire grounding structure of the temporal manifold. The future, typically viewed as a derivative or dependent aspect of time in Priority Presen-

tism, assumes a new role as the foundational basis of reality. This reconfiguration effectively creates a new ontological reality where the past (now including 2026) and the future (beyond 2050) are redefined based on this new 'objective present' of 2050. The diachronic relationships between temporal entities are rewritten, and the present moment is not static but dynamic, capable of being relocated through time travel. Consider some potential paradoxes or inconsistencies: What if the present facts ground a future where event 'e' occurs, but a time traveller then jumps to the future and prevents 'e'? If history itself doesn't change, how is this resolved? In this model, the tensed properties instantiated in the present, which ground the future, must be sufficiently detailed to encompass the entire future, including any time travel events and their consequences. So, if time travel will occur preventing 'e', the grounding property instantiated now would be something like being such that the future contains events leading up to e, followed by time travel disrupting e. The grounded future already accounts for the intervention. Thus, a future-tensed truth grounded now will indeed come to pass (derivatively) as grounded, including any disruptions.

In the context in which David, in the year 2026, decides to travel not to the past, but into the future, specifically to the year 2050, we normally have the case of the flow of time proceeding in a linear fashion, moving from the present moment in 2026 through each subsequent year, culminating in 2050. In the Priority Presentism model, however, David's act of time travel disrupts this linear progression of fundamentality. By travelling to 2050, he shifts the 'objective present' to this future year, altering the typical order in which moments gain the status of being fundamental. This shift of the 'objective present' to 2050 fundamentally alters the grounding of temporal entities. In Priority Presentism, the present moment is where all temporal grounding is centred; it's the basis of reality. When David travels to 2050, he effectively repositions this grounding anchor to the future. This means that the events and entities of 2050, which were previously in the realm of the future and grounded in the 2026 present, now become the new foundation of reality. They assume the role of being diachronically fundamental. The implications of this shift are far-reaching. The period between 2026 and 2050, originally part of an unfolding future, is now recast in light of the new 'objective present' of 2050. The past, including what was once the present in 2026, becomes grounded in this future moment. This redefines the ontological status of these years, reshaping the nature of their existence in relation to the new present. This process effectively rewrites the grounding relationships within the temporal manifold, creating a new ontological reality where the past and future are redefined based on the new 'objective present.'

That is, in the combined model of the MOP model and Priority Presentism, the nature of temporal grounding undergoes a significant transformation. Traditionally, in Priority Presentism, the grounding of past and future entities is grounded in the currently static 'objective present.' However, the MOP model introduces a dynamic element where the 'objective present' can be shifted through time travel. This shift alters the grounding relationship of temporal entities, thereby rewriting the temporal grounding structure of reality. The dynamic nature of the 'objective present' in this model means thus that the grounding of temporal entities is not fixed but is subject to change based on the actions of the time traveller. Hence, in this integrated model, David's travel to 1966 results in a reconfiguration of reality's grounding structure. The past (pre-1966), previously grounded in the 2026 present, now becomes grounded in the new 1966 present. The future (post-1966, including 2026) also becomes grounded in the 1966 present. This shift in the 'objective present' means that events and entities from 1966 onwards are redefined based on this new temporal grounding. It's as if the temporal landscape's grounding is rewritten, with David's presence in 1966 altering the diachronic relationships of grounding for past and future events. Similarly, if David were to travel to the future year of 2050, the grounding structure would shift again, but in the opposite direction. The future (post-2050), previously grounded in the 2026 present, would become grounded in 2050, as would the past (pre-2050, including 2026), redefining the events and entities from 2026 onwards in relation to this new future 'objective present.'

In terms of hypertime, as seen by an Intelligence that views the unfolding of events, the chronological order of events being fundamental shifts. The Intelligence observes the hyperchronological order as t_1966/ht_1, t_1967/ht_2, ..., t_2026/ht_57 (David departs), t_1966/ht_58 (David arrives, 1966 is now fundamental), t_1967/ht_59, reflecting the shift in the 'objective present' due to David's time travel. At the hypertime moment of his travel (ht_58), the 'objective present' (locus of fundamentality) is reoriented to 1966 (t_1966). If David travels to 2050, the Intelligence would observe a different hyperchronological order, such as t_2026/ht_57 (depart), t_2050/ht_58 (arrive, 2050 is fundamental), t_2051/ht_59, reflecting a future-oriented shift of the 'objective present.' This results in the generation of a new hyperpresent reality where the past and future are re-grounded in this shifted present, thus altering the ontological grounding fabric of time itself. David's presence in 1966 doesn't just change his personal timeline; it transforms the foundational grounding structure of temporal existence. And similarly, his presence in 2050 would transform the grounding source for the past, making 2050 the new foundational reality.

In summary, the integrated model of Priority Time Travel, combining Priority Presentism with the Movable Objective Present model, offers a profound redefinition of time travel's metaphysical impact. In this model, a time traveller has the unique ability to shift the 'objective present' (the moment of diachronic fundamentality) within the temporal manifold, altering both their location in time and the fundamental grounding of past, present (relative to the new locus), and future entities. This shift is not a mere relocation but a significant reconfiguration of what is ontologically primary at any given moment in hypertime. We thus have explicated the nature of time and time travel in sufficient detail to provide a means for further clarifying the PER.

3. The Resurrection of Jesus and the Present New Creation

3.1 The Resurrection of Jesus: Falling Elevator Model

In philosophically explicating the PER, we can first, as a preliminary move, provide a philosophical elucidation of the nature of the event of the resurrection that occurred to Jesus after his death. We can do this by adopting elements of a specific model of bodily resurrection proposed by Dean Zimmerman (1999). This model, termed the 'Falling Elevator Model' by Zimmerman (1999), was introduced to demonstrate the cogency of a materialistic model of bodily resurrection. However, we can now employ certain elements of it—specifically, that of the notion of 'fission' (or 'budding') to provide the needed elucidation for the mechanism enabling temporal displacement. We can state this model within our specific context succinctly as follows:

(14) (Resurrection)	Jesus' life and identity are preserved post-mortem through a process in which each particle, principle, or Life contributes to two outcomes: the decomposition of the original body and the continuation of Jesus in a new bodily manifestation across a spatial or temporal gap.

In following Zimmermann (1999), one can understand that when some matter constitutes a given organism, there is a special event—termed a 'Life'—that occurs so long as that organism exists. As Zimmerman (1999, 35) writes, 'As bits of the matter are replaced by new material, the things participating in this Life change;

but so long as the Life goes on, the organism continues to exist, no matter how much material change there has been'. An important aspect of the Life of a particular organism is that of it performing an act of self-maintenance, where the earlier stage of a Life is able to 'immanently cause' later stages—with the latter stages thus being causally dependent upon the earlier stages. Now, within this framework, one can thus understand that, after the death of Jesus, this individual would come back to life in a particular manner. This particular manner could involve 'the Life' of Jesus going one way at t1—namely, to another physical or temporal location (with the possibility of it being able to return back)—whilst the present body of Jesus going another way at t1—namely, that of it remaining in the location where it died and decomposing. More specifically, there are immanent causal connections that 'jump' from the final living state of Jesus at t1, connecting the Life of Jesus to some other location where the organic structure necessary for that Life is preserved or reconstituted. Thus, at the moment of Jesus's death, God could allow each atom (or the Life principle itself) of this individual's body to continue to immanently cause later stages in the decomposition of their present body, where it is located; however, God also confers upon the Life principle or the final state of the atoms the power to immanently cause a perfect duplicate (or reconstituted version) of Jesus at another physical or temporal location. This state of affairs is such that Jesus's body, at the moment of his death, is located at the place of his death. And, as Zimmerman (1999, 36) writes analogously about fission cases, the local, normal, immanent causal process linking each atom to an atom in the individual's body 'is sufficient to secure their identities; no atom ceases to exist merely because it exercised this. . . 'budding' power to produce new matter in a distant location. Still, the arrangement of atoms that appears at a distance is directly immanent-causally connected to my body at the time of my death'. Hence, Jesus, in a certain sense, will forever be 'dead' in terms of the original physical body decomposing (and then ceasing to exist) from the moment of his death. Yet, as God causes the Life or potential of the atoms that make up the body of this individual to 'fission' (or 'bud') at the moment of their death, there are at that particular moment two outcomes—one copy located at the place of Jesus's death r1 (the corpse) and one manifestation located at another physical or temporal location r2—with the latter inheriting the identity-preserving immanent causal relation of the Life. However, as the Life of Jesus goes with the body or manifestation of this individual that is now located at r2, it is the body manifestation located at r2 that is now the successful candidate for the continuation of the pre-fission life of Jesus. We can illustrate this model within this context, in Figure 4., as follows (with 'J' representing Jesus' Life/identity, 'R1' representing

'Golgotha 33CE - corpse', 'R2' representing 'Future location - resurrected body' and the black arrow representing 'the fission/budding process' resulting from death, with the black thick line representing the 'objective present' initially at 33CE):

Figure 4. Falling Elevator Model: Jesus' Resurrection

In light of all that has been said here, a potential theological and exegetical challenge arises when applying Zimmerman's fission model directly to the resurrection of Jesus: the explicit Gospel accounts of the empty tomb (e.g., Luke 24:1-12). If fission implies that the original body (the corpse at r1) simply remains and undergoes a natural process of decomposition, this would appear to contradict the narrative of an empty tomb discovered shortly after Jesus' death. However, this tension can be resolved by positing an additional divine action in conjunction with the fission event. Specifically, one could propose that God, having caused the 'Life' of Jesus to continue in a new (temporally displaced) manifestation (r2) via fission, also miraculously accelerated the decomposition process of the original physical body (r1) left in the tomb to an extraordinary degree. This rapid, supernaturally hastened decomposition would ensure that by the time the tomb was visited, as described in the Gospels, the original body would have entirely decomposed or been reduced to such a state (e.g., dust) as to render the tomb effectively empty. Thus, the empty tomb would not be due to the original body being reanimated or transformed in that location, but rather due to its divinely expedited dissolution following the 'fission' that allowed Jesus' Life to continue elsewhere/elsewhen. In this way, the 'fission' concept can be maintained as the metaphysical mechanism enabling the temporal displacement essential for the proposed time travel aspect of the resurrection, while the empty tomb is accounted for by a distinct but concurrent divine act of accelerated decomposition. This preserves the integrity of both the proposed philosophical model for inaugurated eschatology and the scriptural accounts of the empty tomb.

The question now is, where is the specific location (temporal or spatio-temporal) of r2? That is, where did the resurrected body (and thus the 'Life') of Jesus go at the moment or shortly after his death? The answer postulated here is that of the future, the nature of which we can further elucidate through the integrated model of Priority Time Travel.

3.2 Present New Creation: Priority Time Travel

In proceeding to apply the model of Priority Time Travel to the PER, we are able to further elucidate the effect of Jesus' resurrection on the objective present and future, which can be stated succinctly as follows:

(15) (Resurrection Eschatology)	The resurrection, understood as a fission-like event, enables Jesus to time travel to the future and alter the objective present, shifting it and Jesus to the New Creation moment (e.g., 3033CE), thereby reconfiguring the grounding relations between past, present, and future entities.

The Intelligibility Problem in PER arises from the difficulty in reconciling the coexistence of the future new creation with the present reality. This creates a conceptual conflict within our usual understanding of linear and sequential time – how can something that is not yet realised (future new creation) be actively influencing and transforming the present? Priority Time Travel offers a solution by changing our fundamental understanding of time and its flow of grounding. In Priority Time Travel, time is not strictly linear in terms of which moment is fundamental; instead, the 'objective present' can be manipulated. This means that the present (as the fundamental ground) is not a fixed point moving inexorably forward but can be moved or altered via time travel. When applied to PER, this suggests that the reality of the future new creation can be made present (i.e., fundamental), not as a mere projection or anticipation, but as the active ontological ground of reality.

The concept of hypertime in Priority Time Travel is crucial here. Hypertime allows for a parallel temporal dimension against which changes in the location of the objective present can be ordered. Thus, the future new creation, existing derivatively relative to the 33CE present (at ht_n), can become the fundamental reality at a subsequent hypertime moment (ht_{n+1}) overlapping in its grounding effect with the now derivative present of 33CE. This overlap does not violate the principles of Priority Time Travel; instead, it fits perfectly within its framework where the objective present is not static but dynamic and adjustable. In accordance with the Priority Time Travel model, a time traveller is able to travel to the past or future by having the capability to 'grasp' and control the location of the 'objective present', and thus shift it to their desired location in the temporal manifold, which will also correspond to a shift in their location in time. What is thus postulated here is that, through God's intervening action utilizing the resurrection event (perhaps via fission/temporal transition), at or shortly after the moment of Jesus' death, Jesus'

resurrected Life/body travels into the future to (in picking a symbolic future location and date) Jerusalem 3033CE—the specific time representing the beginning of the new creation on earth. This act simultaneously shifts the objective present (the locus of diachronic fundamentality) from 33CE to 3033CE. Thus, one copy (the corpse) of Jesus' body is located at Golgotha 33CE and the resurrected Jesus is located at Jerusalem in 3033CE— with the Life of Jesus now constituting solely his body in the future location—and thus, it is the successful candidate for the continuation for the pre-fission life of Jesus. We can further elucidate this by looking at the two important features of the MOP, and thus also Priority Time Travel, which is built upon it—namely, that of the relocation of the time traveller and the movability of the objective present.

Focusing on the first aspect of time travel: the relocation of the time traveller, Jesus—from 33 C.E. to 3033 C.E. and then, crucially, back to appear in 33.CE. In the context of hypertime, the events surrounding Jesus, particularly his resurrection and the speculated travel to the year 3033 CE, unfold in a unique sequence. This can be understood through a series of hypertime moments. For instance, let's label the event of Jesus' death and resurrection initiation as occurring at hypertime 33 (ht33), corresponding to the year 33 C.E. in regular time being initially present. Then, hypothetically, Jesus (his resurrected body and the Life that constitutes it) travels to the year 3033 CE, arriving there and simultaneously making 3033CE the objective present at hypertime 34 (ht34). In this hypertime framework, events follow a linear sequence: ht33/33 C.E.—death and resurrection initiation, 33CE is present; ht34/3033 CE— Jesus arrives, 3033CE becomes present. This linear progression in hypertime contrasts with the potential non-linear or repeated sequences of events in regular time. In hypertime, each event (like the shifting of the present) maintains its unique position and order. Moreover, within this hypertime context, events have dual temporal dimensions. An event such as Jesus' resurrection appearances is future in regular time (33 C.E.) relative to his death but occurs after his hypertemporal journey (e.g., at ht35). Similarly, his hypothetical presence in 3033 CE is a future event in regular time (relative to 33CE at ht33) but occurs at ht34 in hypertime making 3033CE present. Moreover, the concept of a duration mismatch between time and hypertime becomes particularly relevant here. For example, while the regular time from 33 C.E. to 3033 CE spans 3000 years, in hypertime, it's potentially condensed into adjacent points: ht33 and ht34.

Now, after his establishment of the 3033CE present (which we posit here symbolizes the inauguration), Jesus returns manifests appearances in the year 33 C.E., which is another point in hypertime—labelled as hypertime 35 (ht35), while

crucially, the objective present remains at 3033CE (as argued in Sec 4). The locations in time here thus occur in a linear hyperchronological order of objective presence shifts and appearances: t33/ ht33 (33CE present), t3033/ht34 (3033CE becomes present, Jesus arrives there), t33/ht35 (Jesus appears back in 33CE, but 3033CE remains present), t34/ht36 (34CE occurs, still grounded in 3033CE present), t35/ht37 (35CE occurs, still grounded in 3033CE present)... That is, events that occur in regular time over a year (denoted as 't') are mapped onto a corresponding point in hypertime (denoted as 'ht'), creating a linear hyperchronological order tracking the state of the objective present and significant events. So, starting with t33/ht33, we have 33 C.E. as the objective present. Then t3033/ht34 represents the shift: 3033 CE becomes the objective present, accommodating the large jump in regular time's 'presentness'. After this, t33/ht35 denotes Jesus' appearance back in 33 C.E. (e.g., at his burial tomb), which is now a new hypertime point, ht35. Even though in regular time Jesus has returned to a year that was previously present, in hypertime, this appearance occurs after the objective present has shifted to 3033, and that 3033 present remains the grounding reality. From this point on, and after Jesus 'ascension' which takes place in 33CE, the series continues with t34/ht36, t35/ht37, etc., indicating that subsequent years in regular time correspond to later hypertime points, but all are now diachronically derivative, grounded in the fixed objective present established at 3033CE.

In focusing now on the second aspect of time travel: the movability of the objective present. It is important to first note, however, that in this specific theological application, when Jesus relocates manifests back to 33CE after establishing the 3033CE present, it is posited (and argued for in Sec. 4) that God makes it as such that the objective present continues to be set at 3033CE and does not return back with Jesus to 33CE. In short, there is a movement concerning the person of Jesus from 33CE to 3033CE and back to appearances in 33CE, but there is solely a movement of the objective present from 33CE to 3033CE, where it then remains. Now, in understanding the nature of the movement of the objective present within Priority Time Travel, one can understand that the mechanism involved here is a shifting of the fundamental 'now'—the present moment that grounds all reality—to a desired temporal location. This shift causes a disruption in the successive temporal order of fundamentality, redefining which moments are considered diachronically fundamental. Hence, Jesus, acting through the resurrection power, effectively travels forward to the year 3033. In a conventional timeline without time travel, the objective present progresses successively: from Jesus' time in 33 C.E. (t1), to events following this period... However, with time travel in the Priority Presentism

model, the objective present is relocated: Jesus' action shifts the 'now' to 3033—Jesus shifts the ontological grounding anchor to this future year. The chronological order of fundamentality is disrupted, with 3033 becoming the new diachronically fundamental moment. That is, by Jesus travelling from 33 C.E. to 3033 C.E., the 'objective present' shifts from 33 C.E. to 3033 CE, which has significant consequences for the grounding of past and future entities. That is, the present moment is where all grounding occurs, determining the fundamental or derivative nature of all other temporal entities—that is, entities are diachronically grounded, meaning their existence at any given time is dependent on their relationship to the present. Consequently, entities and events that were fundamental in the original present of 33 C.E. would become diachronically derivative in this new scenario—they are now grounded in a future that has become the new 'objective present.' Meanwhile, entities and events from 3033 CE, which were initially future projections grounded in the 33 C.E. present, now become diachronically fundamental. They are no longer contingent upon or grounded in the past 'present' but are now the defining basis of reality. This shift in the 'objective present' from 33 C.E. to 3033 CE reconfigures the entire grounding structure of the temporal manifold. The future (New Creation at 3033CE), typically viewed as a derivative or dependent aspect of time in Priority Time Travel, assumes a new role as the foundational basis of reality. This reconfiguration effectively creates a new ontological reality where the past (now including 33 C.E.) and the future (beyond 3033 CE) are redefined based on this new 'objective present' of 3033 CE. The diachronic relationships of grounding between temporal entities are rewritten, and the present moment is not static but dynamic, capable of being relocated through time travel. We can illustrate in Figure 5. what has occurred here through the resurrection Jesus as follows (with 'J' representing Jesus, 'R1' representing 'Golgotha 33CE - corpse', 'R2' representing 'Jerusalem 3033CE - New Creation/Resurrected Jesus', the black arrow representing 'the fission/temporal travel process', and the thick black line indicating the 'objective present' shifting from 33CE to 3033CE):



Figure 5. Priority Time Travel: Jesus' Time Travel

By shifting the 'objective present,' Jesus redefines which entities are diachronically fundamental and which are derivative. That is, entities and events that were fundamental in the original present (33 C.E. in our example) would become diachronically derivative post-time travel (now grounded in 3033). Similarly, entities and events from 3033, which were previously grounded in the 33 C.E. present, would now assume the status of being diachronically fundamental. Priority Time Travel offers a solution to the Intelligibility Objection in Present Eschatological Reality (PER) by focusing on the concept of shifting the objective present, particularly through Jesus' resurrection and his subsequent travel to 3033 CE, which is posited as the beginning (or defining moment) of the new creation on earth. In traditional views of time, the future, especially a concept like the new creation, is seen as not yet existing and, hence, unable to influence the present. The Intelligibility Objection stems from the difficulty in conceptualising how this future new creation can overlap with and impact the current reality. Priority Time Travel addresses this by suggesting that the objective present, the 'now' that anchors all of reality by being the source of grounding, can be moved forward in time. When Jesus, through his resurrection, travels to 3033 CE, according to Priority Time Travel, he doesn't just move through time personally; he shifts the objective present of the entire universe to this future point. This shift is crucial: it means that the future new creation, which begins (or is realized) in 3033 CE, becomes the new 'present' (the fundamental grounding reality) for the entire universe. As a result, what was once considered the future is now the current ontological ground, actively influencing and transforming the derivative present (like 33CE or 2026CE). This repositioning of the objective present to 3033 CE fundamentally changes the grounding of temporal reality. Events and entities that were previously grounded in the 'present' of 33 C.E. become reoriented; they are now in the 'past' relative to the new objective present of 3033 CE and are grounded therein. Conversely, the new creation starting in 3033 CE, which was a future concept, becomes the grounding reality, the new 'now'. Thus, Priority Time Travel resolves the Intelligibility Objection by providing a framework in which the future new creation is not a distant, unrealised event but the present grounding reality that actively shapes and defines existence. It explains how the new creation, though future from the perspective of early 1st century C.E., becomes the present grounding reality post-resurrection, aligning with the theological narrative of a new creation that is both already here (as the ground) and yet also to come (in its full manifestation within derivative time). That is, in addressing the Intelligibility Objection within the framework of Priority Time Travel, the key lies in understanding

how the objective present serves as the grounding point for all temporal entities and how its shift can redefine the relationship between the past, present, and future. From the early 1st century C.E. perspective, the new creation is a future event—a transformative reality that is yet to be actualised. However, through Jesus' resurrection and his subsequent travel to 3033 CE, Priority Time Travel posits a significant shift in the objective present. This shift is not merely a relocation of Jesus through time but a repositioning of the very grounding moment of all temporal existence. In this model, the objective present is the anchor point that defines what is considered the past, present, and future in terms of fundamentality and grounding. When Jesus travels to 3033 CE, he effectively moves this anchor point from the 1st century C.E. to the year 3033 CE. This movement redefines the new creation, initially perceived as a future event, as the current grounding reality. The events of the early 1st century, including Jesus' life and ministry, become part of the past relative to this new objective present and derive their ultimate ontological status from it. This shift has profound implications for how temporal entities are understood. Entities and events that were grounded in the original present of the early 1st century C.E. now become grounded in the new present reality of 3033 CE. What was once the future new creation becomes the present ground, actively existing and influencing the temporal manifold through this grounding relation. This influence consists in the fact that the reality, nature, and significance of all other times (like 33CE or 2026CE) are now ontologically dependent upon, and ultimately defined by, the character of the New Creation established as the present in 3033CE. This aligns with the theological narrative of the new creation being both already present (post-resurrection, as the grounding reality) and yet to come (from the early 1st-century perspective, as a future derivative event). Thus, while this model uses re-grounding rather than direct causal alteration of past events, it provides a robust sense in which the eschaton influences earlier times: it becomes the ontological foundation upon which their existence and nature depend. (Alternative, more radical views, such as those explored by Hud Hudson (2005) or Sam Lebens and Tyron Goldschmidt (2017), might posit that the future could literally change or erase past events, offering a different kind of eschatological influence. This model, however, focuses on the ontological transformation via grounding.) Through the reconfiguration of the objective present, Priority Time Travel offers a solution to the Intelligibility Objection by showing how the future new creation can exist as the grounding present. It provides a theological and temporal framework where the new creation is not just an anticipated future event but an active, present grounding reality that shapes and influences the entire temporal reality.

That is, once the objective present is established in 3033 CE, it becomes the foundational grounding point for all past, present (relative to 3033), and future entities. This means that every moment before 3033 CE, including 33 C.E. and the year 2026 C.E., is now grounded in the reality of 3033 CE. From a temporal perspective, this grounding implies that the characteristics and realities of the new creation in 3033 CE exert ontological defining influence over the earlier years. Grounding, in this context, refers to the way temporal moments derive their reality and significance. Before Jesus' resurrection and travel to 3033 CE, the objective present (and thus the grounding of reality) was in the 1st century C.E. The future, including the new creation, was an unrealised potential, something yet to manifest derivatively. However, when the objective present shifts to 3033 CE – the time of the new creation – this future moment becomes the new grounding point of temporal reality. Therefore, the future new creation, from the perspective of earlier times such as 33 C.E. or 2026 C.E., becomes a present grounding reality because its temporal ground is in the new objective present of 3033 CE. What this means is that the new creation, now being the objective present, retroactively defines the ontological context for all past and present moments leading up to it. The year 33 C.E., the year 2026 C.E., and all other moments in time are now grounded in the reality of 3033 CE. This grounding in the future's new creation imparts its characteristics and realities as the ontological backdrop to these earlier times. From a temporal perspective, it's as if the qualities of the new creation permeate backwards through time via the grounding relation, reshaping the understanding and ontological status of past events. This means that the transformative aspects, values, and realities of the new creation are not merely future expectations but current ontological groundings that actively shape and define the nature of existence in what we perceive as the past and the present. Moreover, when Jesus travels to 3033 CE, he shifts the 'objective present' to this future point, and thus, this shift has profound implications for the diachronic fundamentality of all entities across the temporal manifold. That is, by relocating the objective present to 3033 CE, entities that were previously in the future and thus diachronically derivative (like the new creation) become diachronically fundamental as they enter the new 'present.' Conversely, entities that were fundamental in the original present of 33 C.E. now become derivative as they are situated in the 'past' relative to the new objective present. This redefinition of diachronic fundamentality is key to solving the Intelligibility Objection. The future new creation, once a concept grounded in the future and thus derivative, becomes a fundamental aspect of reality when the objective present shifts to 3033 CE. This means that the new creation is not just influencing the present from the future; it

has become the present ground. The past, including events like Jesus' resurrection appearances, while retaining their historical significance, are now understood in light of their ontological dependence on the new present of 3033 CE.

We can illustrate in Figure 6. the position reached here as follows (with 'NC' standing for 'new creation' at 3033CE, the 'star shape', engulfing the circular shape at 3033CE, representing 'diachronic fundamental existence', 'T.P.' representing 'Temporal Properties' instantiated at 3033CE grounding all other times, the 'oval shape' representing 'the world' at a given time, the 'dashed oval shape' representing the 'past/present state of the world' (e.g., at 33CE or 2026CE) existing derivatively, and the 'singular head arrow' representing a 'synchronic/diachronic grounding relation' originating from 3033CE, 'TT' standing for 'time travel event establishing 3033CE as present', 'NTT' representing the state before time travel):



Figure 6. Priority Time Travel: New Creation Fundamentality

This all seems cogent; however, a few important objections can be raised that stops us from affirming the proposed solution to the Intelligibility Problem. These objections will now be stated with potential responses to them being provided.

4. Objections and Responses

Objection 1. When Christ appears back in the time of his resurrection (33 CE), the objective present would move back with him, undoing the rewriting of

the temporal grounding structure that occurred when he initially travelled to the future eschaton in 3033 CE. This would negate the proposed solution, as the future eschaton would once again become derivative and grounded in the present of 33 CE, rather than being the grounding reality itself.

Response. Typically, in the Priority Time Travel model, when a time traveller returns to their original time, the objective present would follow them back. However, in the case of Jesus' resurrection and his travel to 3033 CE, a unique exception to the norm can be posited based on the theological purpose of the event. When Jesus appears back in 33 CE after his action establishing 3033 CE as present, God intervenes to ensure that the objective present remains anchored in 3033 CE, even as Jesus himself moves manifests back through time to appear. This divine intervention prevents the objective present from automatically following Jesus back to 33 CE, as it might with other time travellers. To illustrate this concept, we can use the analogy of an astronaut planting a flag on the Moon and then traveling back to Earth. In this analogy, Jesus' journey and action establishing 3033 CE as present is like the astronaut's voyage and flag planting. When Jesus acts, he essentially "plants a flag" by shifting the objective present to that future point. This action establishes 3033 CE as the new grounding point for all of temporal reality. Now, when Jesus appears back in 33 CE, it's as if he's traveling back to Earth while leaving the flag (the objective present) on the Moon (3033 CE). God, in this scenario, acts as the force that keeps the flag firmly planted in 3033 CE, preventing it from being pulled back with Jesus to 33 CE. This divine intervention has significant implications for the grounding of temporal reality. By maintaining the objective present in 3033 CE, God ensures that the new creation remains the foundational reality, even as Jesus moves appears back through time. The past, including Jesus' life and resurrection appearances in 33 CE, is now understood and grounded in relation to this future objective present. In essence, God's action in keeping the objective present anchored in 3033 CE while Jesus returns to 33 CE creates a temporal framework where the future new creation is the defining grounding reality. The past and present are not independent realities but are understood and shaped by their ontological dependence on this future grounding point.

Objection 2. The adapted Movable Objective Present (MOP) model integrated with Priority Presentism seemingly contradicts the original intent of hypertime in some models. In standard MOP discussions, hypertime dictates the objective present, aligning it directly with temporal realities. The model presented here, however, suggests a separation between the current hypertime moment of Jesus' appearance (ht35) and the objective present (which remains at 3033CE, established

at ht34), which alters the foundation of how hypertime was intended to function.

Response. The adaptation of the MOP model within a Priority Presentism framework indeed modifies some simple conceptions of hypertime and the objective present interaction. However, this modification is not a departure from the core principles of MOP (movable present) but an extension tailored to accommodate the theological and metaphysical narrative specific to Christian eschatology, particularly the unique divine action described in Response 1. In this adapted model, hypertime still plays the crucial role of ordering the shifts in the objective present and other significant events (like Jesus' appearances). The objective present is established at 3033CE at ht34. Subsequent hypertime moments (ht35, ht36...) occur, containing events like Jesus' appearances in 33CE or the unfolding of history in 34CE, but the locus of fundamentality remains fixed at 3033CE due to divine stipulation. This allows for divine intervention—specifically, God's action in maintaining the objective present at a future point while allowing historical events (now derivatively grounded) to continue influencing the present. This is consistent with the theological claim that divine actions can transcend normal temporal operations while still being locatable within a hypertemporal sequence of events.

Objection 3. If the objective present does not return with Jesus from 3033 CE to 33 CE, it implies that the intervening times (e.g., 34 CE to 3032 CE) were never truly present (i.e., never diachronically fundamental). This seems ontologically strange and potentially contradicts core aspects of presentist intuitions where the present moment is crucial for causal actions and experienced reality.

Response. This model does indeed entail the consequence that the times between 33 CE and 3033 CE never achieve the status of diachronic fundamentality. They exist derivatively, grounded in the objective present of 3033 CE. While this is ontologically counter-intuitive compared to a standard linearly progressing present, it doesn't necessarily negate their reality or causal efficacy within the derivative realm. This model posits that these intervening times are still real (as derivative entities) and causally active among themselves due to their grounding in the 'objective present' of 3033 CE. In this framework, causal actions between derivative entities do not require the direct fundamentality of each moment but rather depend on their existing within the overall structure grounded in the current objective present, wherever it may be located temporally. This approach maintains the causal efficacy within these times by linking them through a network of synchronic and diachronic grounding relationships, all ultimately anchored in the fundamental 3033 CE moment. However, the inherent 'weirdness' of these times never 'having their moment' of fundamentality is acknowledged. This connects to broader challenges facing non-

standard A-theories, such as Baron's own struggle with the 'Now' objection (how do we know we are in the fundamental present if derivative reality is so robust?). This model implies that experiencing an event (like a headache in, say, 500 CE) doesn't require that moment to be diachronically fundamental; its derivative reality, grounded in 3033 CE, is sufficient for the event to occur and be experienced within the context of 500 CE.

Objection 4. If the objective present is now static in 3033 CE, how does this affect the passage of time? Does time cease to move beyond 3033, or does it progress normally within the derivative realm?

Response. The objective present, while fixed in 3033 CE as the fundamental grounding point, does not negate temporal passage for derivative reality beyond this point. Instead, the objective present established in 3033 serves as the ontological anchor from which derivative time continues to unfold sequentially. The continuation of time past 3033 (3034, 3035, 3036...) is ensured by the ongoing dynamic interaction between these derivative past, present, and future elements within the temporal manifold, all grounded in the fundamental reality of 3033CE (and its successors, if the 'static' point itself progresses, e.g., 3033, 3034... become successively fundamental - the model could allow either a static 3033 ground or a ground that starts moving again from 3033). If the ground remains static at 3033, then 3034, 3035 etc. unfold as derivative moments grounded in 3033. If the ground starts moving again from 3033, then 3034 becomes fundamental after 3033, grounding all other times. The theological narrative might favour the latter, representing the ongoing life of the New Creation. Either way, the model allows for continued temporal progression beyond the initial point of the objective present's relocation. This nuanced understanding of time allows the theological and eschatological significance of the New Creation established at 3033 CE to persist while still permitting the normal progression of time and historical causality within the grounded, derivative sequence beyond this eschatological horizon.

In all, Priority Time Travel explains how the new creation, while originating in the future (3033 CE), becomes an intrinsic part of the present by becoming the grounding reality by redefining the temporal grounding point. This approach resolves the Intelligibility Objection by illustrating how the future new creation can exist and actively operate as the ontological ground in the present, thus bridging the theological concept of the 'already' (the present grounding reality of the new creation) and the 'not yet' (the future manifestation of the new creation within derivative time). This model demonstrates how the new creation can be a current grounding reality while still maintaining its future-oriented eschatological signif-

icance. This model allows for a coherent understanding of how the future new creation can be a present, influential force via grounding, thereby addressing the challenges posed by the Intelligibility Objection in PER. One can thus affirm the veracity of the inauguration of the Christian eschaton as a present grounding reality based on the resurrection of Jesus.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, the central focus of this article is on addressing the Intelligibility Objection raised against N.T. Wright's concept of Present Eschatological Reality (PER). Section 1 introduces Wright's concept of PER, emphasising the significance of Jesus' resurrection as the commencement of the new creation. Section 2 unpacks the philosophical underpinnings of time and time travel, integrating Priority Presentism and the Moving Objective Present model to offer a novel perspective on time travel: Priority Time Travel, clarifying its mechanics and the nature of grounding. Section 3 further explores this integration, focusing on how Jesus' resurrection (potentially using a fission-like mechanism for displacement, while acknowledging the empty tomb challenge) and subsequent travel to the future reconfigure the grounding of past, present, and future entities within the temporal manifold, making the New Creation the fundamental ground. And Section 4 detailed some potential objections and responses to them, addressing concerns about the model's coherence, the status of intervening times, and the role of divine action. In all, by synthesising a theological position with refined philosophical models, this article not only clarifies Wright's conception of inaugurated eschatology but also presents a coherent framework for understanding the intersection of time, existence, grounding, and divine action in Christian eschatology.

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