

# CORRUPTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR SOCIETY: ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION

## A CORRUPÇÃO E SUAS CONSEQUÊNCIAS PARA A SOCIEDADE: ANÁLISE E PREVENÇÃO

**VOLODYMYR KLIUSHYN**

National Defence University of Ukraine,  
Kyiv, Ukraine  
[kvv77@gmail.com](mailto:kvv77@gmail.com)

**ANDRII SHEVCHUK**

National Defence University of Ukraine,  
Kyiv, Ukraine  
[personaa1313@gmail.com](mailto:personaa1313@gmail.com)

**TETIANA MALAKHOVA**

State University of Information and  
Communication Technologies, Kyiv, Ukraine  
[tanya\\_elf@ukr.net](mailto:tanya_elf@ukr.net)

**Received:** 09 Aug 2023

**Accepted:** 17 Nov 2023

**Published:** 10 Dec 2023

**Corresponding author:**

[kvv77@gmail.com](mailto:kvv77@gmail.com)



highest level of corruption was detected in the judiciary, with the executive branch of government in second place. An average level of corruption has been identified in the public sector as a whole. The experience of EECA countries demonstrates the correlation between political corruption and the development of civil society, the average level of citizen participation in political life, and particular restrictions on rights and freedoms. The Civil Liberties and Civil Society Participation Indices are still at the same level as the Political Corruption Index. At the same time, in the economic dimension, the dynamics of GDP per capita indicate an increase in the quality of life despite the lack of positive developments in combating corruption. In the social dimension, corruption leads to peaceful protests, increases threats to security and peace, and deepens social inequality among different social groups. The practical significance of the research results lies in formulating recommendations for EECA governments on the digitalization of public services and processes to enhance the transparency of public authorities as a way to prevent corruption.

**Keywords:** Corruption. Perception of corruption. Political corruption. Consequences of corruption. Social transformation.

**Resumo:** Fatores políticos, económicos, sociais e culturais determinam o nível de percepção e corrupção no país por parte dos grupos sociais. Portanto, o estudo deste fenômeno deve ser realizado levando em consideração os fatores delineados. O objetivo do artigo acadêmico é estudar e analisar as consequências da corrupção para as sociedades em dimensões-chave: política, econômica e sociocultural. Metodologia. O método de análise sistemática é utilizado no artigo acadêmico para identificar tendências gerais de corrupção no mundo e nos países da Europa Oriental e da Ásia Central, tendo em conta os riscos crescentes de corrupção devido à guerra na Ucrânia. As consequências da corrupção são consideradas nas seguintes dimensões: política, econômica e social. Inicialmente, os autores analisam a dinâmica do Índice de Percepção de Corrupção em 2018-2022. Os seguintes indicadores foram utilizados para avaliar a corrupção: Índice de Corrupção Política, Índice de Corrupção Legislativa, Índice de Corrupção no Setor Público, Índice de Corrupção Executiva, Índice de Corrupção Judicial e Decisões de Corrupção do Poder Judiciário. Os resultados da análise da percepção da corrupção e da corrupção política na região EECA demonstram a falta de mudanças dinâmicas no combate e prevenção do abuso de poder. Ao longo de 2012-2022, observou-se na região um valor estável do Índice de Percepção da Corrupção (34,5 - 35 pontos) e da corrupção política (0,5 pontos numa escala de 0 - 1). O nível mais elevado de corrupção foi detectado no sistema judiciário, com o poder executivo do governo em segundo lugar. Foi identificado um nível médio de corrupção no sector público como um todo. A experiência dos países da EECA demonstra a correlação entre a corrupção política e o desenvolvimento da sociedade civil, o nível médio de participação dos cidadãos na vida política e restrições específicas aos direitos e liberdades. Os Índices de Liberdades Cívicas e de Participação da Sociedade Civil ainda estão no mesmo nível do Índice de Corrupção Política. Ao mesmo tempo, na dimensão econômica, a dinâmica do PIB per capita indica um aumento da qualidade de vida, apesar da falta de desenvolvimentos positivos no combate à corrupção. Na dimensão social, a corrupção leva a protestos pacíficos, aumenta as ameaças à segurança e à paz e aprofunda a desigualdade social entre os diferentes grupos sociais. O significado prático dos resultados da investigação reside na formulação de recomendações aos governos da EECA sobre a digitalização dos serviços e processos públicos para aumentar a transparência das autoridades públicas como forma de prevenir a corrupção.

**Palavras-chave:** Corrupção. Percepção de corrupção. Corrupção política. Consequências da corrupção. Transformação social.

## 1. Introduction


Corruption is a problem characteristic of all societies, the prevalence of which depends on various factors: political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological (Mutaşcu & Dănuleştiu, 2010). Accordingly, different dimensions of this phenomenon are distinguished, and within each dimension, several consequences can be outlined (Mutaşcu & Dănuleştiu, 2010). During the period of modernization and social transformation, corruption can be more widespread since new sources of national wealth and power are being generated. In such conditions, new social norms for preventing and counteracting abuse of power for personal gain are not enshrined (Huntington, 2017). Different societies, depending on the state of institutional norms and rules, social-economic development, and political stability, will experience different levels of both perceptions of corruption and its consequences. As noted by Melgar, Rossi & Smith (2010), the perception of corruption can be considered a cultural phenomenon, given the understanding of different social

groups of the rules and norms related to illicit enrichment. The justification for abuse of power is explained by both personal moral and value views and the potential benefits of different individuals (Melgar, Rossi & Smith, 2010; Li, Xiao, Gong, 2015). The study of the phenomenon should be conducted taking into account its consequences in the political, economic, socio and cultural spheres of society (Mutaşcu & Dănuleşiu, 2010). In the political sphere, abuse of power undermines trust in government actions, democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, and leads to political conflicts and disputes. In the economic sphere, a high level of corruption leads to instability of institutions, deterioration of economic relations and the level of trust between business entities, and an increase in the shadow economy. In the socio-cultural sphere, corruption leads to increasing social inequality, and problems related to the protection of the rights of minorities and the most vulnerable groups of the population. The outlined issues require a detailed study.

The purpose of the academic paper is to study and analyze the consequences of corruption for societies in key dimensions: political, economic, socio and cultural.

## **2. Literature review**

Political corruption lies in the abuse of public position and authority for personal gain (Heywood, 1997). Taking into account the different perceptions of corruption by citizens of various countries, tolerance to this phenomenon also differs significantly (Gong & Wang 2013). Situational variables influence the severity of corruption in a country, the level of cultural acceptance of corruption, and the likelihood of prevention, counteraction, and punishment (Nayir & Herzig 2012). Institutional factors, practices, policies and strategies, and government anti-corruption campaigns determine the incentives for public disclosure of results in combating and preventing corruption (Figure 1) (Taylor & Curtis 2010). Therefore, such a multilevel approach to determining the factors influencing the state of corruption in a country includes cultural and institutional aspects, taking into account the importance of anti-corruption practices and policies (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005), emphasizes the cultural dimension of corruption (Tavakoli, Keenan & Cranjak-Karanovic, 2003).



**Figure 1.** Factor contributes to citizens' whistleblowing intention, acts and anonymity decisions  
Source: (Li et al., 2015).

Empirical studies of corruption show that the majority of the public supports and approves of abuses of power because they receive significant economic benefits (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Li, Xiao, Gong, 2015; Klašnja, Lupu & Tucker, 2021). The effectiveness of the government's political decisions and measures aimed at the social and economic development of the country can be reflected in a more positive perception and a higher level of tolerance to abuse of power. There is a significant positive correlation between citizens' tolerance and the economic benefits they obtain (Li, Xiao, Gong, 2015).

Choi and Woo (2010) analyzed 115 developing countries in their scientific work and revealed that citizens are satisfied with a significant improvement in the quality of life and economic development, despite the political corruption of the government and the preservation of political power. In addition, political corruption did not play a significant role in determining political leaders in the elections. In another study, the authors confirmed that national economic conditions weaken the negative perception of political corruption by citizens (Choi & Woo, 2012). A survey of citizens in Greece conducted by Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) shows that voters neutralize the corruption of politicians if they provide significant collective benefits. Manzetti and Wilson (2007) conclude that economic benefits are more important than punishment for corrupt leaders in countries with weak state institutions and strong social relations. This correlation is especially evident in authoritarian systems, where political legitimacy is based not on free elections, but on certain unique abilities and characteristics of political leaders (Chen, 1997).

The economic success of the country and the improvement of the quality of life of the population contribute to the legitimacy of the government through its achievements (Yang & Zhao, 2018).

Thus, studies have found positive correlations between improved economic well-being and public support for a corrupt government, provided it is effective. At the same time, the results and conclusions of the studies are based on analyzing macroeconomic variables (economic development, corruption at the national level).

### 3. Methods

The academic paper examines general global trends in corruption and focuses on the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, taking into account the increasing corruption risks due to the war in Ukraine and, accordingly, their enhanced impact on the societies of the countries of this region in the following dimensions: political, economic, social. Initially, the authors analyze the dynamics of the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018-2022 in the world and by region according to Transparency International. Further, the focus is on the EECA region – Eastern Europe and Central Asia – to highlight the correlations between political and economic instability due to corruption, weakening institutions and the hybrid war against Ukraine, as well as various violent conflicts. The selected region for the research most fully characterizes the negative effects of corruption on societies in various dimensions.

The following indicators were used to evaluate corruption: Political corruption index, Legislative corruption activities, Public sector corruption index, Executive corruption index, and Judicial corruption decision (Table 1).

**Table 1.** Overview of evaluating indicators of political corruption

| Assessment indicator of political corruption | Brief description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Evaluation scale                                                    |
|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Political corruption index                   | Characterizes the prevalence of political corruption: from less corrupt to more corrupt. Characterizes different types of corruption at various levels of government in different spheres (executive, legislative, judicial). The index is calculated based on the average value of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. corruption index in the public sector;</li> <li>2. index of corruption in the executive branch;</li> <li>3. indicator of legislative corruption;</li> <li>4. corruption in the courts</li> </ol> | Interval: 0 - 1.                                                    |
| Public sector corruption index               | Characterizes the frequency of services provided by public sector employees in exchange for bribes,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Interval: 0 - 1 (0 means a more democratic situation). The index is |

|                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                   |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                | kickbacks, other material incentives, the frequency of theft, embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, and resources for personal or family use.                                                                                                                                            | calculated as an average of two indicators: bribery in the public sector and embezzlement                                                                         |
| Legislature corrupt activities | Characterizes the abuse of legislative bodies for financial gain: bribery, assistance in obtaining state contracts for firms owned by the legislator, providing services to firms in exchange for employment opportunities, stealing public funds, and making campaign donations for personal use. | The sequential one is converted to interval: Answers: 0: Usually. 1: Often. 2: Sometimes. 3: Very rarely. Maybe some 4: Never or rarely.                          |
| Executive corruption index     | Characterizes the regularity of services provided by members of the executive branch or their agents in exchange for bribes, other material incentives, the frequency of theft, embezzlement, and misappropriation of public funds, and resources for personal or family use.                      | Interval: 0 - 1 (0 means a more democratic situation). The index is calculated as an average of two indicators: bribery in the executive sector and embezzlement. |
| Judicial corruption decision   | Characterizes the frequency of making unconfirmed additional payments or bribes by individuals or companies to speed up or delay processes or obtain a favourable court decision.                                                                                                                  | Sequential: Answers: 0: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half the time. 3: Usually not. 4: Never.                                                                     |

Source: compiled by the author based on data from Coppedge et al. (2022), V-Dem.

## 4. Results and Discussion

### 4.1. Analysis of corruption: political corruption, corruption in the public sector

Corruption is a cause and a consequence of destabilizing regional and international security and peace, undermining the government's ability to democratize society and protect fundamental rights and freedoms. As a result, the level of public trust in the government's actions is declining in a highly corrupt state. Government restrictions on the rights and freedoms of the population continue to be applied in most countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Transparency International, 2023b).


According to the dynamics of the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018-2022 (Table 2), the average score in Eastern Europe and Central Asia was 34,5-35 points. As a result, as compared to other regions of the world, this region has historically had the poorest conditions in terms of combating and preventing corruption. In particular, attention should be paid to the increase in corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2022, with growing political instability, weakening institutions, and intensification of the hybrid war against Ukraine. In general, governments of this region negatively influence the activities of civil society, undermining democratization and restricting media freedom.

**Table 2.** Dynamics of the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018-2022 in the world and by regions

| Region                       | Average values for the region |                     |                |                     |                |                     |                |                     |                |                     |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------|
|                              | CPI score 2018                | Standard error 2018 | CPI score 2019 | Standard error 2019 | CPI score 2020 | Standard error 2020 | CPI score 2021 | Standard error 2021 | CPI score 2022 | Standard error 2022 |
| AME                          | 43,719                        | 2,908               | 43,375         | 3,212               | 43,375         | 2,400               | 43,125         | 2,174               | 42,969         | 2,263               |
| AP                           | 44,387                        | 2,956               | 44,871         | 3,128               | 45,290         | 2,381               | 45,097         | 2,226               | 45,129         | 2,363               |
| ECA                          | 34,526                        | 2,969               | 34,789         | 3,319               | 35,947         | 2,300               | 35,684         | 2,230               | 35,211         | 2,061               |
| MENA                         | 38,556                        | 3,639               | 39,000         | 4,152               | 39,111         | 2,990               | 38,722         | 2,965               | 37,500         | 2,710               |
| SSA                          | 32,245                        | 3,140               | 32,245         | 3,025               | 32,306         | 2,120               | 32,510         | 2,197               | 32,388         | 2,234               |
| WE/EU                        | 66,323                        | 2,484               | 66,065         | 2,567               | 65,806         | 1,648               | 65,871         | 1,469               | 65,516         | 1,598               |
| Average value for the region | 43,117                        | 2,986               | 43,167         | 3,141               | 43,344         | 2,240               | 43,267         | 2,153               | 42,978         | 2,181               |

Source: compiled by the author based on data from Transparency International (2023).

The Political Corruption Index characterizes its prevalence in societies as a global problem and ranges from 0 to 1: from less corrupt to more corrupt. The Political Corruption Index is calculated based on indicators of six different types of corruption in different public spheres at different political levels: executive, legislative, and judicial. In the executive branch, corruption is generally connected with embezzlement and bribery in the highest echelons of the executive branch (at the level of the government/cabinet of ministers) and the public sector in general. In 2012, the Political Corruption Index was 0,56, and in 2022 – 0,48, which indicates an average level of prevalence of political corruption (Figure 2). The highest level of corruption is observed in the judiciary: the score was 2,12 in 2012 and 2,31 in 2022. Thus, in about half of the cases in courts, individuals or companies make additional payments or bribes to speed up or delay processes or obtain a favourable court decision. Interference in the judicial system by various interested parties is one of the key corruption risks in the region.



**Figure 2.** Dynamics of the Political Corruption Index, Public Sector Corruption Index, Legislature Corrupt Activities, Executive Corruption Index, Judicial Corruption Decision in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2012-2022


Source: compiled by the author based on data from Coppedge et al. (2022). V-Dem.

The level of corruption in the executive branch is high: the score was 1,58 in 2012 and 1,75 in 2022, indicating a slight decrease in the level of abuse of the legislature for financial gain. The executive branch sometimes receives bribes, assists in obtaining state contracts for firms it owns, provides services to firms in exchange for employment opportunities, and steals state funds and donations for personal use.

The average level of corruption in the public sector as a whole was as follows: 0,49 in 2012 and 0,43 in 2022 with no significant changes. This means that in many cases, public sector employees provide services in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, and other material incentives, and commit theft, embezzlement, and misappropriation of public funds.

Figure 3 shows clear differences in the levels of political corruption in Eastern and Central Europe (a) and Central Asia (b).





a) Eastern and Central Europe

b) Central Asia

**Figure 3.** Assessments of political corruption in Eastern, Central Europe and Central Asia, 2000-2022

Source: Coppedge et al. (2022). V-Dem.

It is worth focusing on the example of combating corruption in Ukraine, especially in the conditions of war, taking into account the increase in the Corruption Perceptions Index from 26 points in 2012 to 33 points in 2022. The level of tolerance to corruption in Ukraine over the past 2010-2020 proves the high involvement and support of the civil society sector in corruption. Even in 2020, 60% of citizens had corruption experience (The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2023). There was little change in the situation with countering and combating abuse of power (Transparency International, 2023).

Corruption is a systemic phenomenon in the country; however, several important steps have been taken over the past few years to strengthen government accountability and control, in particular through the introduction of the concept of e-government. In June 2022, the parliament adopted the National Anti-Corruption Strategy until 2025, appointing a new head of the office for bringing corruption cases to court (National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 2023). Strengthening the institutional capacity and functions of public authorities that are most vulnerable to corruption also contributed to countering the abuse of power.

The development of the Strategy is based on the following basic principles (National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 2023):

- optimization of the functions of state authorities and local self-government; it provides deprivation of excessive powers of the authorities, elimination of duplication of their functions;
- reducing the “human factor”, and increasing the efficiency and transparency of public sector relations with the public. In the context of achieving this principle, it is envisaged to introduce rules of general administrative procedures and digitalize processes and services;
- creation of legal alternatives to corrupt practices;

- ensuring effective state control over compliance by public servants with the rules of ethical behaviour and requirements of anti-corruption legislation;
- ensuring the inevitability of liability for corruption and corruption-related offences.

Given the institutional changes in 2022, there have been shifts in the following indicators in Ukraine:

1. In the political sphere, the level of perception of corruption has changed: 86,9% of respondents considered corruption in the Government or the Verkhovna Rada a serious/very serious problem (compared to 94,4% of respondents in 2021); 79,6% noted the seriousness of the problem of corruption in business (compared to 85,3% in 2021); 68,7% of respondents noted the problem of everyday household corruption (compared to 76,2% in 2021).


2. The public's perception of the prevalence of corruption in certain areas has significantly decreased compared to 2021: the judiciary and customs are ranked first in terms of corruption (index 4,35), land relations and border control are ranked second (indexes 4,05 and 4,06, respectively). In general, 81,1% of citizens reported the prevalence of corruption in 2022. From the perspective of the business environment, the most widespread corruption is in the areas of permitting, mining, customs, forestry, land relations, public procurement of works and services in the field of construction, repair and maintenance of roads (National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 2023b).

#### **4.2. Analysis of the consequences of corruption for the society of different countries. Political consequences of corruption**

The experience of EECA countries demonstrates the correlation between political corruption and the development of civil society and its participation in political life. Given the government's anti-corruption initiatives, the Civil Liberties and Civil Society Participation Indices, like the Political Corruption Index, remain at the same level across the region and vary slightly from country to country.

The Civil Liberties Index characterizes the level of respect for civil liberties in a country – liberal freedoms of individuals. Civil liberty is the absence of physical violence by government agents, and the absence of restrictions on private freedoms and political liberties by the government. The Civil Liberties Index in EECA countries was 0,76 in 2012 and decreased to 0,72 in 2022, indicating minor restrictions on citizens' freedom. Thus, according to Zakaria (2013), corruption in Central and Eastern Europe has been a major factor in undermining civil society in

the region, manifested in the negative impact of political corruption on trust and post-communist civil society (Zakaria, 2013).



**Figure 4.** Dynamics of the Civil Liberties Index and the Civil Society Participation Index in EECA countries, 2012 - 2022

Source: compiled by the author based on data from Coppedge et al. (2022), V-Dem.

The Civil Society Participation Index characterizes the level of unity of citizens to defend their interests, including political ones. In 2012, the value of the Index was 0,62, and in 2022 – 0,6, which characterizes the average level of development of civil society institutions in EECA countries.

### 4.3. Economic consequences of corruption

Major consequences of corruption in the economic sphere include the lack of positive changes in the growth of the level of life quality and incomes of the population. According to the dynamics of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, EECA countries with different levels of political corruption have different levels of increase in this indicator. For instance, in Afghanistan, GDP per capita decreased by 15% in 2012-2021. At the same time, a significant increase in the quality of life is observed in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, and Poland (Table 3). It is noteworthy that the life quality in Ukraine has declined significantly due to the war: GDP per capita decreased from 14,000 USD to 12,000 USD in 2021-2022. However, in general, while GDP per capita in the EU-27 averaged 42,8 thousand USD in 2012-2022, in EECA countries it was 22,6 thousand USD over the same period. Thus, corruption significantly affects the population's life quality. Thus, according to the results of the study conducted by

Mutaşcu & Dănuleşiu (2010), the limitation of corruption phenomena has led to an increase in social welfare in 27 European Union's countries over the period 1996-2008 (Mutaşcu & Dănuleşiu, 2010).

**Table 3.** Dynamics of GDP per capita in EECA countries by purchasing power parity (PPP), current USD, 2012 - 2022

| Country Name        | 2012    | 2018    | 2019    | 2020    | 2021    | 2022    | Average, 2012-2022 | Growth 2012-2022, % |
|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Afghanistan         | 1958,4  | 2110,2  | 2168,1  | 2078,6  | 1674,0  | --      | 2041,0             | -15%*               |
| Belarus             | 18105,3 | 19430,9 | 20106,1 | 20317,2 | 21928,7 | 22590,6 | 19519,9            | 25%                 |
| The Czech Republic  | 29254,7 | 41143,8 | 44212,7 | 42827,1 | 45630,0 | 49945,5 | 38650,6            | 71%                 |
| Estonia             | 25996,0 | 36410,1 | 39007,2 | 39441,8 | 43476,9 | 46697,4 | 34704,5            | 80%                 |
| Croatia             | 21463,7 | 28909,4 | 31588,0 | 29690,2 | 34721,9 | 40379,6 | 27914,0            | 88%                 |
| Hungary             | 23267,4 | 31908,9 | 34645,6 | 34169,9 | 36773,3 | 41906,7 | 30649,8            | 80%                 |
| Kazakhstan          | 22032,2 | 26158,4 | 27469,4 | 26782,1 | 28811,9 | 30809,9 | 25745,5            | 40%                 |
| Kyrgyz Republic     | 3618,1  | 5256,6  | 5481,4  | 4990,9  | 5444,2  | 6132,5  | 4835,6             | 69%                 |
| Lithuania           | 24703,7 | 36376,5 | 39957,6 | 40176,5 | 43796,8 | 48396,7 | 34712,3            | 96%                 |
| Moldova             | 7277,3  | 12434,6 | 13318,8 | 12512,6 | 15009,6 | 15238,1 | 11278,5            | 109%                |
| Poland              | 23589,1 | 32027,6 | 34976,0 | 35315,7 | 38134,8 | 43268,5 | 31081,3            | 83%                 |
| The Slovak Republic | 26994,1 | 31369,8 | 33453,3 | 32922,1 | 34528,7 | 37459,5 | 31246,3            | 39%                 |
| Slovenia            | 29042,8 | 38971,8 | 42088,7 | 40871,8 | 43974,2 | 50031,7 | 37081,5            | 72%                 |
| Turkmenistan        | 11635,8 | 14665,4 | 15628,5 | --      | --      | --      | 13442,4            | 34%**               |
| Ukraine             | 9705,4  | 12633,5 | 13348,0 | 13102,8 | 14289,0 | 12671,2 | 11888,9            | 31%                 |
| Uzbekistan          | 6061,9  | 7289,3  | 7717,7  | 7822,7  | 8607,5  | 9532,5  | 7286,1             | 57%                 |

Source: compiled by the author based on data from the World Bank (2023).


\* calculated for 2012-2021; \*\* - calculated for 2012-2019.

#### 4.4. Social consequences of corruption

Democracy is defined by the United Nations (UN) as the best way to ensure peace on a global scale, which promotes diplomatic resolution of conflicts. However, corruption significantly violates democratic principles of governance. The Russian war against Ukraine, which began in February 2022, is one example of the threats posed by corrupt authoritarian regimes to international security, peace, and political and economic stability. It is corruption that leads to the

weakening of autonomous political institutions and civil society. At the same time, “favouritism in the allocation of public contracts, licenses and concessions, kickbacks and other corrupt schemes helped a small group of oligarchs amass great fortunes that largely depend on loyalty to the regime”.

Corruption schemes are used to destabilize countries and societies, spreading distrust among the population in the legitimacy of governments. The historical examples of Iran, Qatar, and Russia prove that corruption is targeted at the leaders of countries they seek to control through significant resources. Corruption leads to the weakening of political actors and social groups that support them, thus ensuring the promotion of corrupt officials’ foreign policy goals. As a result, citizens distrust the actions of the government and state institutions, and the level of threats to the security of societies increases. For instance, a high level of security threats (attacks and bombings, deaths as a result of hostilities, terrorism, and coups) can be observed in countries with low CPI scores in 2022 (Figure 5).



**Figure 5.** Linear Dependence of CPI Score 2022 and Security Threats in the World, 2022

Source: (Transparency International’s, 2023; Fund for Peace’s, 2023).

As a result of threats to security, peace and stability, citizens express social discontent in the form of peaceful protests. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has documented social protests in 130 countries since 2017. In 55 out of 130 states, at least one protest was related to public dissatisfaction with the level of corruption. 80% of corruption-related protests were held in countries with CPI scores below 50.

Corruption exacerbates social inequality among different social groups. Quintile income inequality is the lowest in the following Eastern European countries: the Slovak Republic, the

Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland (Table 4). For comparison, Estonia and Hungary have a much higher quintile income inequality ratio (more than 7) – 5,58 and 4,23 on average in 2013-2022, respectively.

**Table 4.** Quintile coefficient of income differentiation (ratio of shares of income quantiles for 80/20) for disposable income in some Eastern European countries, 2013-2022

| Period              | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | Average, 2013-2022 |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------------------|
| Estonia             | 5,54 | 6,48 | 6,21 | 5,56 | 5,42 | 5,07 | 5,08 | 5,03 | 5,03 | 5,39 | 5,481              |
| Poland              | 4,88 | 4,91 | 4,92 | 4,76 | 4,56 | 4,25 | 4,37 | 4,07 | 4,03 | 3,91 | 4,466              |
| The Slovak Republic | 3,58 | 3,93 | 3,54 | 3,63 | 3,49 | 3,03 | 3,34 | 3,03 | 3,2  | 3,12 | 3,389              |
| Slovenia            | 3,6  | 3,7  | 3,6  | 3,56 | 3,42 | 3,38 | 3,39 | 3,32 | 3,24 | 3,28 | 3,449              |
| Hungary             | 4,29 | 4,33 | 4,3  | 4,26 | 4,27 | 4,35 | 4,23 | 4,16 | 4,15 | 3,99 | 4,233              |
| The Czech Republic  | 3,4  | 3,5  | 3,51 | 3,5  | 3,4  | 3,32 | 3,34 | 3,34 | 3,44 | 3,48 | 3,423              |

Source: compiled by the author based on data from Eurostat (2023).

## 5. Conclusions

The analysis of the perception of corruption and political corruption at different levels of government in the EECA region shows a lack of dynamic changes in countering and preventing abuse of power. Throughout 2012-2022, a stable value of the Corruption Perceptions Index was observed in the region (34,5 - 35 points). The countries as a whole have historically had the worst situation with combating and preventing corruption compared to other regions of the world. In addition, political corruption has traditionally remained at an average level (0,5 points on a scale of 0 - 1) in 2012-2022. The highest level of corruption was revealed in the judiciary, followed by the executive branch. An average level of corruption has been identified in the public sector in general. The experience of EECA countries demonstrates the correlation between political corruption and the development of civil society, the average level of citizen participation in political life, and certain restrictions on rights and freedoms. The Civil Liberties and Civil Society Participation Indices are still at the same level as the Political Corruption Index. At the same time, in economic terms, the dynamics of GDP per capita indicate an increase in the quality of life despite the lack of positive developments in combating corruption. In the social dimension, corruption leads to peaceful protests, increases threats to security and peace, and exacerbates social inequality among different social groups.

The example of Ukraine shows an increase in public attention to corruption and a slight decrease in its perception of the conditions of war, growing political instability and strengthening the institutional capacity of the country's anti-corruption system. Although the level of tolerance to corruption in Ukraine in 2010-2020 was characterized by high involvement and support of the civil society sector in corruption, there are certain shifts in 2022. Institutional changes in 2022 contributed to a change in the level of perception of corruption in the political sphere. The public's perception of the prevalence of corruption in certain areas has significantly decreased compared to 2021.

## References

- Chen, F. (1997). The dilemma of eudaemonic legitimacy in post-Mao China. *Polity*, 29(3), 421-439.
- Choi, E., & Woo, J. (2010). Political corruption, economic performance, and electoral outcomes: A cross-national analysis. *Contemporary Politics*, 16(3), 249-262.
- Konstantinidis, I., & Xezonakis, G. (2013). Sources of tolerance towards corrupted politicians in Greece: The role of trade offs and individual benefits. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 60, 549-563.
- Coppedge, M. et al. (2022). V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date]. Dataset Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22>
- Eurostat (2023). Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 for disposable income by sex and age group EU-SILC survey. Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/IILC\\_DI11/settings\\_1/table?lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/IILC_DI11/settings_1/table?lang=en)
- Fund for Peace's (2023). Fragile States Index 2022. Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22-FSI-Report-Final.pdf>
- Gong, T., & Wang, S. (2013). Indicators and implications of zero tolerance of corruption: The case of Hong Kong. *Social Indicators Research*, 112, 569-86.
- Heywood, P. (1997). Political corruption: Problems and perspectives. *Political Studies*, 45, 417-35.
- Huntington, S. P. (2017). Modernization and corruption. In *Political corruption*, 253-264. Routledge.
- Klašnja, M., Lupu, N., & Tucker, J. A. (2021). When do voters sanction corrupt politicians? *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 8(2), 161-171.
- Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V., & Soares, R. R. (2005). Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter. *Economics & politics*, 17(1), 1-35.
- Li, H., Xiao, H., Gong, T. (2015). The impact of economic well-being on perceptions of anti-corruption performance: Evidence from China. *Policy and Society*, 34 (2), 97-109. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.05.001>
- Manzetti, L., & Wilson, C. J. (2007). Why do corrupt governments maintain public support? *Comparative political studies*, 40(8), 949-970.
- Melgar, N., Rossi, M., & Smith, T. W. (2010). The perception of corruption. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 22(1), 120-131.
- Mutaşcu, M., & Dănuleşiu, D. C. (2010). Corruption and Social Welfare in the EU27 Countries. *Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica*, 12(1), 450-459.
- National Agency on Corruption Prevention (2023a). Anti-corruption strategy. Available at: <https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/antykoruptionsijna-strategiya/>
- National Agency on Corruption Prevention (2023b). Report on the results of the survey of the population and business: Corruption in Ukraine 2022: Understanding, Perception, Prevalence. Available at: <https://nazk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/1f23b766-e031-4c3f-81a4-0167b4f93116.pdf>



Nayir, D. Z., & Herzig, C. (2012). Value orientations as determinants of preference for external and anonymous whistleblowing. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 107, 197-213.

Tavakoli, A. A., Keenan, J. P. & Cranjak-Karanovic, B. (2003). Culture and whistleblowing an empirical study of Croatian and United States managers utilizing Hofstede's cultural dimensions. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 43, 49-64.

Taylor, E. Z., & Curtis, M. B. (2010). An examination of the layers of workplace influences in ethical judgments: Whistleblowing likelihood and perseverance in public accounting. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 93, 21-37.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2023). On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2021-2025. Law of Ukraine 2322-IX as of 20.06.2022. Available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2322-20#Text>

Transparency International (2023). Score changes 2012-2021. Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/ukr>

Transparency International's (2023a). CPI 2022 Global Results & Trends. Available at: [https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2022\\_GlobalResultsTrends.xlsx](https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2022_GlobalResultsTrends.xlsx)

Transparency International's (2023b). CPI 2022: Corruption as a fundamental threat to peace and security: Research analysis by Roberto Martínez B. Kukutschka. Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-corruption-fundamental-threat-peace-security>

Winters, M. S., & Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2013). Lacking information or condoning corruption: When do voters support corrupt politicians? *Comparative Politics*, 45(4), 418-436.

World Bank (2023). GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$). International Comparison Program, World Bank. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?view=chart>

Yang, H., & Zhao, D. (2018). Performance legitimacy, state autonomy and China's economic miracle. In *Debating Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China*, 174-192. Routledge.

Zakaria, P. (2013). Is corruption an enemy of civil society? The case of Central and Eastern Europe. *International Political Science Review*, 34(4), 351-371.